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PATCHING THE HOLES IN SOX: FCPA DISGORGEMENT
AFTER LIU AND THE NDAA
ABSTRACT
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) forbids companies and persons
from bribing foreign officials to secure business and creates an affirmative duty
for companies to maintain valid accounting records. Since 2004, following the
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) has pursued “equitable remedies” under 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)
to disgorge profits from those who have violated the FCPA. Despite apparent
legislative acceptance of disgorgement, the Supreme Court put disgorgement’s
legality into doubt in two recent decisions. The first, Kokesh v. SEC in 2017,
established that disgorgement had to happen within a five-year statute of
limitations period. The second, Liu v. SEC in 2020, held that disgorgement
might not be allowed as an equitable remedy if, as in FCPA cases, the money
disgorged was sent to the Treasury rather than wronged investors.
At the close of 2020, Congress responded to these decisions. To preserve the
powers of the SEC to protect U.S. financial markets, Congress passed legislation
that expressly granted the SEC disgorgement powers and raised the statute of
limitations to ten years for select securities law violations. Despite this new
legislation, questions still exist as to whether the SEC must abide by the
limitations on its disgorgement powers set out by the Liu decision and which
statute of limitations applies to FCPA disgorgement. This Comment argues that
disgorgement under the newly revised Section 78u(d) should be allowed for
FCPA actions that send money to the Treasury, regardless of whether the
limitations imposed by the Liu decision still apply. Further, this Comment
asserts that, in light of the uncertainty likely to arise from the new changes to
Section 78u(d), Congress should revise the statute to expressly allow the SEC to
disgorge profits to the Treasury in FCPA actions with a ten-year statute of
limitations. Finally, this Comment argues that the best solution for concerns
about the slow pace of SEC enforcement would be new legislation that allows
for SEC self-funding derived from FCPA disgorgement remedies.
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INTRODUCTION
From 2004 to 2007, banker Garth Peterson crossed ethical and legal lines.1
Peterson, a fluent speaker of Mandarin2 and head of the Shanghai branch of
Morgan Stanley’s global real estate office, “secretly bribed a [Chinese]
government official to illegally win business for his employer.”3 Peterson
insisted that his colleagues owed this official a favor because the official had
“really gone out of his way” to help them get a deal over a competitor.4 This act
of bribery ultimately enriched Peterson to the tune of more than $1.8 million.5
A large portion of these ill-gotten gains were in the form of a property interest
in a luxury high-rise apartment building in Shanghai, which he jointly invested
in with his corrupt foreign counterpart.6 After his deception was discovered by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Peterson agreed to disgorge
profits of over $250,000, as well as his interest in the property, worth over $3.4
million (referenced in this Comment as the Peterson case).7
Peterson faced civil, criminal, and—importantly for this Comment—
equitable penalties because he violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA).8 Yet, had he committed those same actions today, he may have gained
materially from his crimes at the cost of his competitors, his employer, and the
rule of law as a result of the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Liu v. SEC.9 This
8-1 decision, which only partially upheld the SEC’s ability to seek
disgorgement,10 threatened the ability of the SEC to bring disgorgement at all in

1
Press Release, SEC Charges Former Morgan Stanley Executive with FCPA Violations and Investment
Adviser Fraud, SEC (Apr. 25, 2012) (available at https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2012-2012-78htm).
2
Aruna Viswanatha, Former Morgan Stanley Star in China Pleads Guilty, REUTERS (Apr. 25, 2012,
10:01
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-sec-morganstanley/former-morgan-stanley-star-in-chinapleads-guilty-idUKBRE83P03J20120426.
3
Press Release, SEC Charges Former Morgan Stanley Executive, supra note 1.
4
Complaint at 13, SEC v. Peterson, 2012 WL 1440462 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 12CV 02033) (“[T]he
Chinese Official showed Peterson the written offer of one competing bidder in confidence ‘to make clear the
competition we’re facing’ and had ‘really gone out of his way to help [Morgan Stanley] on this deal.’”).
5
Id. at 1.
6
Id. at 12.
7
Press Release, SEC Charges Former Morgan Stanley Executive, supra note 1. Peterson was also
sentenced to nine months in prison due to related Department of Justice criminal charges. See Scott Cohn, ExMS Banker in China Bribery Case: My Side of Story, CNBC (Aug. 16, 2012, 7:27 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2012/08/16/exms-banker-in-china-bribery-case-my-side-of-story.html.
8
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2018).
9
140 S. Ct. 1936 (2020).
10
Id. at 1940. Disgorgement refers to remedies that “eliminate profit from wrongdoing while avoiding,
so far as possible, the imposition of a penalty.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 51 (AM. L. INST. 2010).
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civil actions involving FCPA violations.11 Post-Liu changes to the law that
expressly allow the SEC to seek disgorgement and raise the statute of limitations
for some securities law violations,12 while a laudable first step by Congress, have
not completely addressed the problems created by Liu and Kokesh v. SEC, a
2017 case in which the Supreme Court first questioned the equitable nature of
SEC disgorgement.13
Part I of this Comment discusses the FCPA, which was passed in the
aftermath of the Watergate scandal when congressional hearings revealed a
pattern of questionable foreign payments by U.S. corporations.14 This legislation
allows the SEC to pursue civil actions against issuers15 and their officers, like
Peterson, when they bribe foreign officials to secure business.16 The FCPA also
creates an affirmative duty on these issuers to maintain books, records,17 and
internal control systems to prevent such actions.18 Part II explores how the SEC
has used legislation to enforce FCPA actions before and after the introduction
of a provision within the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. This provision
enabled the SEC to seek “any equitable relief that may be appropriate or
necessary for the benefit of investors” under any provision of the securities laws,
providing a statutory basis for the use of disgorgement in judicial enforcement
actions.19 However, due in part to alleged SEC overreach,20 the Supreme Court
has threatened the viability of disgorgement as an SEC enforcement action in
the recent decisions of Kokesh and Liu. Part III argues that, despite the absence
of specific identifiable victims in FCPA enforcement, disgorgement is both an
“appropriate” and “necessary” relief, and that courts should allow it as an
equitable remedy subject to certain limits.21 Part IV analyzes recent changes to
the statute that expressly authorized disgorgement and raised the statute of
limitations for certain security violations. This Part argues that the murky nature
11
See Disgorgement’s Role in SEC Enforcement Actions: An Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Decision
in Liu v. SEC, CADWALADER (June 24, 2020), https://www.cadwalader.com/resources/clients-friends-memos/
disgorgements-role-in-sec-enforcement-actions-an-analysis-of-the-supreme-courts-decision-in-liu-v-sec.
12
Pub. L. No. 116-283 § 6501, 134 Stat. 3388, 3416 (2021).
13
137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017).
14
Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 929, 932 (2012).
15
FCPA 101, FCPA PROFESSOR, https://fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-101/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2022) (“An
‘issuer’ is generally a company (U.S. or foreign) that has a class of securities . . . traded on a U.S. exchange or
an entity that is otherwise required to file reports with the [SEC].”).
16
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1) (2018).
17
Id. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
18
Id. § 78m(b)(2)(B).
19
Id. § 78u(d)(5).
20
See Dieter Juedes, Taming the FCPA Overreach Through an Adequate Procedures Defense, 4 WM. &
MARY BUS. L. REV. 37, 55 (2013).
21
See Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1940 (2020) (describing § 78u(d)(5)’s requirements).
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of this new legislation creates open questions about FCPA disgorgement that
Congress should rectify with additional legislation. In doing so, Congress should
take the opportunity to provide the SEC with the type of funding that is
commensurate with its considerable responsibilities.
I.

FCPA BACKGROUND

Passed in 1977, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was an audacious
piece of legislation. This “pioneering statute” was the first in the world to govern
“domestic business conduct with foreign government officials in a foreign
market.”22 Investigations in the 1970s by the Office of the Watergate Special
Prosecutor, the SEC, and a congressional subcommittee revealed that U.S.
corporations had made inappropriate contributions to the President of the
Republic of Korea, “a Saudi Arabian general,” Italian political parties, the
President of Honduras, and others.23
Congress believed that legislation prohibiting acts of bribery was warranted
for many policy reasons. Among them were concerns about foreign policy, the
protection of investors,24 morality, foreign support, and the protection of the
entire free market economy. Congressional rhetoric showed concerns for U.S.
investors and about the damage to the reputation of American business abroad.25
Advocates for passing the FCPA stressed that the vast bulk of ethical lawabiding American businesses should not suffer because of the actions of a few
bad apples.26 Congressional debate revealed worries that if those tempted to
bribe foreign officials were not deterred from continued acts of bribery, the
resulting bad publicity might lead to further communist appropriation of
American businesses or the rise of another nationalist like Quaddafi.27 Members
of a congressional committee believed that most countries would invite U.S.
efforts to discourage “the corrupting influence of some United States-based

22

Koehler, supra note 14, at 930 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 932–35.
24
The Commission initially indicated it did not want to be in charge of regulating “a particular aspect of
corporate behavior,” stressing that it was a disclosure agency. Id. at 963. The Ford administration advocated, but
failed, to put forward legislation that would have established a disclosure role for the SEC, rather than an
enforcement role. Id. at 984.
25
Rachel Brewster, Enforcing the FCPA: International Resonance and Domestic Strategy, 103 VA. L.
REV. 1611, 1625–26 (2017).
26
Koehler, supra note 14, at 937.
27
Id. at 939–40 (quoting Sen. Frank Church, who argued “[t]he large and steady gains made by the Italian
Communist Party in recent elections” were due to their appearance as the only “non-corrupt political force in
the country” because American businesses had given bribes to “moderate democratic and pro-free-enterprise”
forces in that country).
23
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multinationals.”28 Furthermore, bribery itself corroded and could destroy the
entire free market system,29 and a law prohibiting bribery would make it easier
to resist the temptation corporations might feel to bribe foreign officials.30
Bribery, if tolerated, would direct business “not to the most efficient producer,
but to the most corrupt.”31
While many advocated for the introduction of the FCPA, some voiced
concerns about the proposed legislation. Some questioned the wisdom of making
it illegal for U.S. businesses to engage in foreign bribery in countries where
bribery was not illegal.32 Furthermore, Congress and the press debated the idea
that holding U.S. businesses accountable might put them at a competitive
disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign competitors.33 Despite these objections, Congress
passed the FCPA, and President Carter signed it into law in 197734 as an
ambitious effort to stop a practice that was seen as “both corrupt and
counterproductive.”35 The FCPA provides the SEC36 with the tools to solve the
problem of international corruption in two distinct ways: anti-bribery
provisions37 and accounting provisions.38 The SEC is responsible for civil
enforcement of these provisions “over ‘issuers’ . . . and their officers, directors,
employees, agents, or stockholders acting on the issuer’s behalf.”39 Section A
below explains the anti-bribery provisions and section B explains the accounting

28

Id. at 945.
Id. at 947; cf. Brewster, supra note 25, at 1625 (describing how improper payments damage the
credibility of the U.S. economic system and lend credence to Marxists)
30
Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977: Hearing on H.R. 3815 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer
Prot. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Rels., 95th Cong. 1–2 (1977) (statement of Rep. Eckhardt,
Chairman, Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. & Fin.).
31
Koehler, supra note 14, at 947.
32
Id. at 972–75.
33
Compare Milton S. Gwirtzman, Is Bribery Defensible?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1975, at 20 (“The
American businessman who won’t pay off foreign officials risks loss of sales to competitors who continue the
practice without embarrassment.”), with Koehler, supra note 14, at 947 (“[P]rohibiting payments to foreign
government officials could give U.S. companies a competitive advantage and actually help companies resist
foreign payment demands.”).
34
Koehler, supra note 14, at 1002.
35
Id. at 981.
36
While this Comment focuses on the powers given to the SEC, a brief mention of DOJ responsibilities
is warranted. The DOJ has criminal enforcement authority over “issuers” and individuals employed for these
companies. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2018). Additionally, the DOJ has criminal and civil enforcement responsibilities
over “domestic concerns” and persons other than issuers or domestic concerns. Id. §§ 78dd-2, 78dd-3.
37
Id. § 78dd-1.
38
Id. § 78m(b)(2)(A); Id. § 78m(b)(2)(B).
39
DEP’T OF JUST. & SEC, FCPA: A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICE ACT 4
(n.d.) [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE], https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf. Issuers are
companies that are listed on a national securities exchange or trade their stock in the over-the-counter market
and are required to file SEC reports. Id. at 11.
29
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provisions. Finally, section C explains what remedies the SEC has available to
enforce these provisions.
A. The FCPA Anti-Bribery Provisions
The FCPA anti-bribery provisions can be enforced against U.S. companies
and nationals without any U.S. nexus40 and even foreign issuers and nationals
whose only connection to the United States is an email that goes through a U.S.based server.41 Generally, the anti-bribery provisions prohibit “individuals and
businesses from bribing foreign government officials in order to obtain or retain
business.”42 More specifically, issuers and their employees are prohibited from
“offering to pay, paying, promising to pay, or authorizing the payment of money
or anything of value to a foreign official” as a means of “influenc[ing] any act
or decision of the foreign official in his or her official capacity or . . . secur[ing]
any other improper advantage in order to obtain or retain business.”43 For
example, in the Peterson case, Peterson’s offers and payments to the Chinese
official to secure business for Morgan Stanley were violations of the anti-bribery
provisions of the FCPA.44
B. The FCPA Accounting Provisions
The SEC is also responsible for enforcing the FCPA’s accounting
provisions. There are two components to these provisions. First, the “books and
records” provision45 reflects the idea that an issuer should provide accurate
information to its shareholders.46 Second, the internal control provisions47
compel the company to ensure that it establishes a system of compliance with
the books and records obligations. Because historically “corporate bribery has
been concealed by the falsification of books and records,” these two accounting
provisions aim to prevent their coverup.48 If an issuer were to try to conceal a
40

15 U.S.C §§ 78dd-1(g), 78dd-2(i) (2018).
See SEC v. Straub, 921 F. Supp. 2d 244, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
42
RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 39, at 10.
43
Id.
44
Complaint at 1, SEC v. Peterson, 2012 WL 1440462 (E.D.N.Y. May 10, 2012) (No. 12-CV-02033);
see supra Introduction.
45
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (2018) (“Every issuer . . . shall (A) make and keep books, records, and
accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets
of the issuer.”).
46
Koehler, supra note 14, at 942 (“Not only is a publicly owned corporation unaccountable to the public
when it uses its assets to bribe foreign governmental officials, but also it is unaccountable to its shareholders,
the ones to whom the assets belong.” (citations omitted)).
47
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (2018).
48
S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 3 (1977).
41
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bribe to a foreign official as something else, such as a consulting fee or a
miscellaneous expense, they would be in violation of the books and records
provision.49 The existence of an effective internal control system, in theory,
should prevent these violations. For example, German automobile manufacturer
Daimler AG was accused by the SEC of paying bribes of at least $56 million to
government officials to secure business in twenty-two countries, violating the
anti-bribery provisions.50 Daimler AG then hid these payments, which were in
violation of the FCPA books and records provisions, as “after sales service
fees.”51 The SEC argued that, despite its obligations as an issuer on U.S. markets,
Daimler’s FCPA compliance program was “virtually non-existent.”52
Accordingly, Daimler agreed to pay $91.4 million in disgorgement53 to settle the
SEC charges and $93.6 million in fines.54 When an organization, such as Morgan
Stanley in the Peterson case, has a well-funded effective compliance system in
place, it can avoid liability for the acts of individuals who commit violations of
the anti-bribery provisions or circumvent the internal control provision.55 The
FCPA also contains “one exception and two affirmative defenses” baked into
the statute to prevent it from being too heavy-handed.56

49

RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 39, at 39.
Final Judgment as to Defendant Daimler AG at 2, SEC v. Daimler AG (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2010) (No.
10-CV-473).
51
Id.
52
Id. at 5.
53
Daimler AG was required to pay the money to the SEC and the SEC was then required to remit the
funds to the U.S. Treasury. See Final Judgment as to Defendant Daimler AG at 11-12, 10-CV-0047 (D.D.C.
2010). In the Peterson case, Peterson’s ill-gotten gains were in the form of an ownership interest in a Shanghai
apartment complex, which was relinquished to a court-appointed receiver. Conceivably these funds did or
ultimately will end up in the U.S. Treasury. See Press Release, SEC Charges Former Morgan Stanley Executive,
supra note 1.
54
Investor Bulletin: SEC Investigations, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 22, 2014), https://www.sec.
gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ib_investigations.html.
55
Amy J. Conway-Hatcher, The Big Three FCPA Lessons from the Morgan Stanley Case, LEXOLOGY
(July 11, 2012), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e8b770f4-311c-46f8-ac4a-3d3facff075b.
56
FCPA 101, supra note 15. Congress was aware of foreign, cultural, and legal differences, and carved
out an exception to the FCPA allowing facilitating payments to foreign officials for “routine government action.”
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b) (2018); see Koehler, supra note 14, at 976 (“The definition of a bribe does differ from
country to country.”); cf. Gwirtzman, supra note 33, at 110 (explaining West German law allowed companies to
deduct foreign bribes on their tax returns). The anti-bribery provisions do not prohibit “payments made to secure
permits, licenses, or the expeditions performance of similar duties of an essentially ministerial or clerical nature.”
FCPA 101, supra note 15. In addition, the first of the two affirmative defenses recognizes cultural and legal
differences and permits the payment of “anything of value” that is “lawful under the written laws and
regulations” in the foreign country. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(1) (2018). The second affirmative defense allows the
payment of “anything of value” if it was a “reasonable and bona fide expenditure” for a foreign official, “such
as travel and lodging expenses” for the purposes of product demonstration or towards executing or performing
a contract. Id.; id. § 78dd-1(c)(2).
50
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C. Consequences for FCPA Violations
The SEC may bring an enforcement action for any violation of a federal
securities law.57 Accordingly, under the FCPA, the SEC can pursue civil actions
against issuers and their directors, officers, employees, agents, or stockholders
for violations of both the anti-bribery and accounting provisions of the Act.58
The SEC has access to “a panoply of sanctions and remedies.”59 Statutorily,
violations of the anti-bribery provisions by either corporations or individuals can
lead to penalties of up to $16,000 per violation for corporations and $16,000 per
violation for individuals.60 Violations of the accounting provisions allow the
SEC to obtain a civil penalty “not to exceed the greater of (a) the gross amount
of the pecuniary gain to the defendant as a result of the violations or (b) a
specified dollar limitation.”61 Depending on the egregiousness of the violations,
these limitations could be as high as $150,000 for an individual or $725,000 for
a company.62 Additionally, there are non-monetary penalties that both
individuals and companies can face, such as debarment.63
It is important to note that the SEC, at its founding in the 1930s, did not even
have the statutory power to obtain monetary relief.64 Instead, securities laws only
permitted the SEC to seek “injunctions, registration revocations, and
professional bars.”65 Nevertheless, it sometimes did obtain relief for investors as
early as the 1940s despite the lack of statutory authority to do so.66 In 1968, the
Second Circuit recognized the ability of the SEC to obtain equitable relief as an
ancillary remedy despite the lack of express statutory authority.67 In SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur, a case famous for establishing the ability of the SEC to

57
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (2018); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 13 (2017), https://
www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf (explaining when enforcement actions can take place).
58
RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 39, at 10–11, 42–43.
59
Urska Velikonja, Public Enforcement After Kokesh: Evidence from SEC Actions, 108 GEO. L.J. 389,
443 (2019).
60
RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 39, at 69.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 69–72.
64
Velikonja, supra note 59, at 399.
65
Id.
66
See John D. Ellsworth, Disgorgement in Securities Fraud Actions Brought by the SEC, 1977 DUKE L.J.
641, 642–43 (1977); see also In re The Purchase and Retirement of Ward La France Truck Corp. Class “A” &
Class “B” Stocks, 13 SEC Decisions Orders & Releases 373, No. 4-51 at 378 (1946) (finding companies who
violated securities laws would repay stockholders for lost value).
67
SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d 833, 864 (2d Cir. 1968); see also Roberta S. Karmel, Will
Fifty Years of the SEC’s Disgorgement Remedy Be Abolished?, 71 SMU L. Rev. 799, 809 (2018) (arguing federal
courts have inherent authority to order disgorgement under general securities laws).
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enforce insider trading violations,68 the Second Circuit also made clear that
injunctions alone were not sufficient to prevent violations of securities laws.69
The court dismissed the defendant’s argument that the SEC was only able to
impose an injunction or restraining order.70 Instead, the Second Circuit reasoned
that courts can use “their inherent equity power” when it is “necessary for the
protection of the investing public.”71 The court ordered that the defendants pay
the profits they had gained from their scheme into an escrow account that could
be accessed by the “SEC or other interested person” and would return to the
company at the end of three years.72 Thus, while Congress had not granted
authority to the SEC to seek disgorgement or any other equitable remedy when
the FCPA was passed in 1977, the SEC had been routinely using disgorgement
as a remedy alongside its statutorily granted powers for at least nine years.73
In 2002, the nature of the FCPA changed dramatically with the arrival of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).74 Passed with overwhelming support75 in the
aftermath of the Enron76 and Worldcom77 scandals, SOX made substantial

68
See Lisa M. Fairfax, From Equality to Duty: On Altering the Reach, Impact, and Meaning of the Texas
Gulf Legacy, 71 SMU L. REV. 729, 730 (2018).
69
Following remand in 1971, the case returned to the Second Circuit, which upheld the combination of
injunctions and disgorgement. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308, 1310 (2d Cir. 1971), aff’g
in part, rev’g in part 312 F. Supp. 77, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
70
Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. at 90–91.
71
Id. at 91.
72
Id. at 93. While the court and the SEC described the measure taken as “accounting and restitution,”
scholars typically describe it as disgorgement. See Karmel, supra note 67, at 801; Velikonja, supra note 59, at
399–400 (“The measure of the disgorgement remedy is the somewhat vaguely defined ill-gotten gain, which is
similar to but not coextensive with restitution, and includes any ‘tangible profit causally connected’ to the
securities violation.”).
73
See Velikonja, supra note 59, at 399. Other circuits soon followed the Second Circuit in allowing
disgorgement as an equitable remedy. E.g., Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571, 576 (4th Cir. 1969); Fridrich v.
Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 322 (6th Cir. 1976) (“[T]he SEC may ask the federal district court, in the exercise of its
equity jurisdiction . . . to require an insider to disgorge any profits he may have made from his illegal trading.”).
The SEC first used disgorgement in an FCPA case in 1983. SEC v. World-Wide Coin Inv., 567 F. Supp. 724,
760 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
74
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 107 P.L. 204, 116 Stat. 745; see Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Signs Bill
Aimed at Fraud in Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2002, at A1.
75
It passed the House with a vote of 423 in favor, 3 opposed, and 8 abstaining. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, CLERK, FINAL VOTE RESULTS FOR ROLL CALL 348, https://clerk.house.gov/evs/2002/
roll348.xml. It passed the Senate with 99 in favor and 1 abstaining. Roll Call Vote 107th Congress–2nd Session,
U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=107&
session=2&vote=00192 (last visited Feb. 2, 2022).
76
See Troy Segal, Enron Scandal: The Fall of a Wall Street Darling, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.
investopedia.com/updates/enron-scandal-summary/ (Nov. 26, 2021).
77
See Adam Hayes, The Rise and Fall of WorldCom, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/w/worldcom.asp (Oct. 5, 2021).
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changes to the makeup of the country’s regulatory oversight regime, generally,78
and to the SEC’s powers to enforce the FCPA, specifically.79 SOX has led to a
dramatic surge in FCPA enforcement.80 Important for the context of the SEC’s
ability to punish violators of the FCPA was the insertion of Section 78u(d)(5)
into Section 21(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, allowing equitable
relief.81 Section 78u(d)(5) reads, “In any action or proceeding brought or
instituted by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the
Commission may seek, and any Federal court may grant, any equitable relief
that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors.”82 Like it did
in response to the bribery scandals of the 1970s, Congress had, perhaps
unwittingly, significantly increased the power of the SEC to seek much broader
remedies under all types of securities violations than it had previously been able
to do.83 Because the SEC had been using disgorgement as a way to secure
equitable relief for decades,84 it continued to do so, albeit with increased vigor.85
With the new disclosure requirements imposed by SOX,86 the SEC’s
enforcement actions increased both in number and in payout.87 However,
because Congress failed to expressly define what remedies were equitable,88 and
the legislative history was largely silent,89 the SEC’s use of disgorgement was
criticized as not “equitable.”90 This conflict between the SEC and its critics
78
For example, SOX created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. 107 P.L. 204, 116 Stat.
745 (2002).
79
See Will Kenton, Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/s/sarbanesoxleyact.aspp (Feb. 4, 2020).
80
See Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 515 (2011).
81
107 P.L. 204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
82
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5).
83
See Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1940 (2020). See generally Michael F. Perlis, Investigating the FCPA,
FORBES (Dec. 8, 2009, 1:06 PM), https://www.forbes.com/2009/12/08/foreign-corrupt-practices-act-opinionscontributors-michael-perlis-wrenn-chais.html#666cab114e81 (detailing the rise frequency of FCPA enforcement
actions and sizes of awards over time).
84
Karmel, supra note 67.
85
See Laura E. Kress, How the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Has Knocked the “SOX” off the DOJ and SEC and
Kept the FCPA on Its Feet, 10 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 10–12 (2009); Thomas Fox, The FCPA and Sox
and Internal Controls–Twin Sons of a Different Mother?, JDSUPRA (May 13, 2016),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-fcpa-and-sox-and-internal-controls-31210/.
86
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745; see Kenton, supra note 79.
87
See FCPA 101, supra note 15.
88
15 U.S.C § 78u(d)(5).
89
There is argument over whether this means that Congress meant to allow disgorgement. Compare
Karmel, supra note 67, at 802 (“Congress assumed that disgorgement was an equitable remedy the SEC could
obtain in the district courts.”), with Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners at 2, Liu v.
SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936 (2020) (No. 18-1501) (“Congress has not extended the same authorization to pursue awards
of ‘disgorgement.’”).
90
See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 89, at 2, 4; SEC v. Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1644 (2017).
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would come to a head in several cases, which would make their way before the
Supreme Court and plunge the area of law into confusion91—a development that
is the focus of Part II.
II. RECENT CHALLENGES: KOKESH AND LIU
After the passage of SOX, enforcement of the FCPA became a priority for
the SEC and increased significantly.92 Though underfunded,93 the agency
increased the number of enforcement actions under the FCPA after 2002.94 In
2010, it created a specialized unit solely for focusing on violations of the
FCPA.95 In an effort to encourage corporations to cooperate with the SEC, the
enforcement wing of the SEC announced the existence of new tools for
adherence to the new rules,96 and warned wrongdoers that their “hushed
plans[,] . . . schemes and deceptions” would come to light.97
However, despite the SEC’s optimism and stern warnings, several Supreme
Court decisions, both preceding and following the enactment of SOX in 2002,
have threatened the SEC’s ability to fully deter wrongdoers. Section A of this
Part explains how the Supreme Court put the brakes on the ability of the federal
courts to craft equitable remedies in Grupo Mexicano de Desarollo, SA v.
Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. by forcing these courts to look to the historic record to
determine the availability of an equitable remedy in 1789. Some lower courts,
such the Second Circuit in SEC v. Cavanagh, narrowed the ruling of Grupo by
looking to the purpose of the remedies. Section B discusses the 2017 decision of
Kokesh v. SEC, in which the Supreme Court looked at the ability of the SEC to
seek equitable remedies and signaled in a footnote that disgorgement for SEC
enforcement purposes might not be equitable at all. Finally, section C explores
the Liu v. SEC decision from 2020, in which the Court upheld the ability of the
91

See infra Part II.
See Thomas R. Fox, FCPA Enforcement: Why the Increase Between the First 25 Years and the Last
5?, FCPA COMPLIANCE & ETHICS BLOG (Mar. 11, 2011), https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/
corporate/b/fcpa-compliance/posts/fcpa-enforcement-why-the-increase-between-the-first-25-years-and-thelast-5.
93
See Kurt N. Schacht, SEC, Strapped for Funds, Can’t Police Financial Markets, THE HILL (July 9,
2018, 9:30 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/396064-sec-strapped-for-funds-cant-protect-investors.
94
See Fox, supra note 92.
95
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Names New Specialized Unit Chiefs and Head of
New Office of Market Intelligence (Jan. 13, 2010) (available at https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/20105.htm).
96
Speech, Robert S. Khuzami, Dir., SEC Div. of Enf’t, Remarks at News Conference Announcing
Enforcement Cooperation Initiative and New Senior Leaders (Jan. 13, 2010) (available at
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch011310rsk.htm).
97
Id.
92
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federal courts to grant disgorgement as an equitable remedy if they adhered to
certain principles.
A. Grupo-Mexicano’s “Historic” Approach
The first U.S. Supreme Court case that threatened the powers of the SEC
under SOX was Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund.98 While
the particulars of the case are not important to this Comment, what is important
is the Court’s view on the powers of the federal district courts to grant equitable
remedies.99 In a 5-4 opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Court found that the
federal district courts had been conferred jurisdiction over “all suits . . . in
equity” by the Judiciary Act of 1789.100 Justice Scalia’s opinion interpreted this
to mean federal courts only had jurisdiction to dispense equitable relief that was
“traditionally accorded by courts of equity” at the time of the passage of the
Judiciary Act101—that is, 1789. While prior to Grupo, the federal courts had not
been shy about enlarging the contours of what would be allowed as equitable
measures, this decision signaled that there would be significant limitations on
what would be allowed moving forward.102
Despite Grupo, the power of the SEC to seek disgorgement for violations of
securities laws remained unthreatened for nearly twenty years. For example, in
a 2006 opinion, the Second Circuit upheld the SEC’s use of disgorgement to
enforce violations of the registration and antifraud provisions of securities
laws.103 The court reasoned that what was important was not the name of the
remedy historically used by equity courts, “but rather their specific actions and
the resulting practical consequences.”104 The court then underwent the sort of
historical survey105 advocated for by Justice Scalia in Grupo and held that the
fact that “the term ‘disgorgement’ ha[d] entered common legal parlance only
recently” did not “obscure that the ancient remedies of accounting, constructive

98

See Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo v. All. Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308 (1999).
Id. at 318.
100
Id. (citations omitted).
101
Id. at 319. But see id. at 336 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court relies on an unjustifiably static
conception of equity jurisdiction. From the beginning, we have defined the scope of federal equity in relation to
the principles of equity existing at the separation of this country from England.”).
102
See Theresa A. Gabaldon, Equity, Punishment, and the Company You Keep: Discerning a
Disgorgement Remedy Under the Federal Securities Laws, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1611, 1651–52 (2020).
103
SEC v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 109, 121 (2d Cir. 2006).
104
Id. at 118.
105
Id. at 118–20.
99
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trust, and restitution ha[d] compelled wrongdoers to ‘disgorge’ . . . their illgotten gains for centuries.”106
B. Kokesh’s Footnote Three Threatened the Existence of SEC Disgorgement
Writ Large
In 2017, the Supreme Court returned to the question of the SEC’s power to
disgorge as an equitable remedy in Kokesh v. SEC.107 The issue in Kokesh was
not whether disgorgement was an equitable remedy, but rather whether
disgorgement was a penalty for the purposes of a five-year statute of limitations
in 28 U.S.C § 2462.108 The Court, which had previously ruled that Section
2462’s five-year limitation applied when the Commission sought monetary civil
penalties,109 analyzed whether Kokesh—an adjudged fraudster who, between
1995 and 2009, misappropriated nearly $35 million from four companies that
sought investment advice from his firms—would have to disgorge those
funds.110 The SEC alleged that Kokesh concealed his ill-gotten gains through
filing “false and misleading SEC reports and proxy statements” and sought civil
penalties, disgorgement, and an injunction against Kokesh.111 The district court
ruled, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed, that disgorgement of $29.9 million in illgotten gains was appropriate—even though it fell outside of the five-year statute
of limitations period—because disgorgement was not a “penalty” under Section
2462.112
The Supreme Court overturned the decision, holding that for the purposes of
Section 2462, disgorgement was a penalty.113 This decision was based on two
rationales. First, a sanction is a penalty when it is trying to redress a wrong to

106
Id. at 119. But see Francesco A. DeLuca, Sheathing Restitution’s Dagger Under the Securities Acts:
Why Federal Courts Are Powerless to Order Disgorgement in SEC Enforcement Proceedings, 33 REV. BANKING
& FIN. L. 899, 930 (2014) (arguing Cavanagh was wrongly decided because disgorgement was only allowed
historically in English equity cases involving fiduciary obligations).
107
137 S. Ct. 1635, 1639 (2017).
108
Id.
109
See Gabbelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442, 445, 454 (2013). The Court also held that the statute of limitations
period began when the allegedly fraudulent conduct occurred, not when it was brought to light. Id. at 454. This
threatens FCPA enforcement actions in which acts of bribery often take over four years to be investigated. See
The Gray Cloud of FCPA Scrutiny Lasted Too Long in 2017, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 4, 2018) [hereinafter Gray
Cloud], https://fcpaprofessor.com/gray-cloud-fcpa-scrutiny-lasted-long-2017/. This is counterbalanced by subsequent
changes to Section 78u(d) that toll the statute of limitations for any time a person is outside of the United States.
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(8)(C) (2021).
110
Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1641.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 1645.
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the public, rather than to an individual.114 Disgorgement, the Court reasoned, is
a remedy for a violation of public laws, which is why “a securities-enforcement
action may proceed even if victims do not support or are not parties to the
prosecution.”115 Second, “a pecuniary sanction operates as a penalty” only if it
is sought to punish and deter, rather than for the purpose of “compensating a
victim for his loss.”116 The Court decided that disgorgement is punitive, meaning
it primarily functions as a deterrent against future violations.117 Furthermore,
disgorgement is not always compensatory. Sometimes “disgorged funds are paid
to victims; other funds are dispersed the United States Treasury.”118
Accordingly, Kokesh walked away with nearly $30 million in ill-gotten gains
because his fraud did not come to light quickly enough.119
The Court’s conclusion—that “[b]ecause disgorgement orders ‘go beyond
compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers’ as a
consequence of violating public laws, they represent a penalty”120—erected a
serious hurdle to the SEC’s enforcement abilities by labeling it as a penalty for
statute of limitations purposes.121 Even more ominous, a footnote the Court
included seemed to threaten the entire existence of court-ordered disgorgement
as an equitable remedy.122 While the footnote stated that the Court was not
opining on whether “courts possess[ed] authority to order disgorgement in SEC
enforcement proceedings,”123 commentators remarked that it was “widely
understood to threaten”124 the existence of the remedy. This footnote, along with
pointed questions raised during oral argument that criticized the lack of express

114

Id. at 1642.
Id. at 1643.
116
Id. at 1642.
117
Id. at 1643 (“[T]he primary purpose of disgorgement orders is to deter violations of the securities laws
by depriving violators of their ill-gotten gains.” (citations omitted)).
118
Id. at 1644.
119
Id. at 1641.
120
Id. at 1645 (citations omitted).
121
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT: DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT 5 (2018), https://www.sec.
gov/files/enforcement-annual-report-2018.pdf (“[T]he decision may cause us to forego up to approximately
$900 million in disgorgement.”).
122
Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1642 n.3 (“Nothing in this opinion should be interpreted as an opinion on whether
courts possess authority to order disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceedings or on whether courts have
properly applied disgorgement principles in this context.”).
123
Id.
124
Velikonja, supra note 59, at 423.
115
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statutory permission to disgorge funds,125 was viewed as an invitation to
challenge what the SEC and observers had viewed as a long-settled remedy.126
C. Liu Lays Out Limitations
The challenge to disgorgement as an equitable remedy that many expected
after Kokesh arrived in the summer of 2020 in Liu v. SEC.127 In Liu, husband
and wife Charles Liu and Xin Wang solicited foreign nationals to invest nearly
$27 million to construct a cancer treatment center through the EB-5 Immigrant
Investor Program.128 Instead of spending the money on a center, they spent
nearly $20 million on salaries and marketing expenses—far in excess of what
their offering memorandum permitted—and diverted funds to a personal
account.129 After their behavior came to light, the SEC brought a civil action in
federal court seeking disgorgement of the full amount they had raised from
investors, as well as an injunction against the couple from participating in the
EB-5 Program.130 The couple argued that they should be able to offset the
disgorgement award by millions of dollars in operating expenses, while the SEC
argued that it would be unjust to allow them to claim business expenses to run a
business meant to defraud investors.131 The district court sided with the SEC and
held the couple jointly and severally liable for the full amount they had raised
from investors, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.132 The Supreme Court granted
their petition for certiorari.133
The Supreme Court, in an 8-1 opinion written by Justice Sotomayor, largely
sided with the SEC and upheld its ability to disgorge profits under Section
78u(d)(5) as a remedy allowed as equitable relief.134 In making this judgment,
the Court looked to works on equity jurisprudence and determined disgorgement

125
Sarah N. Lynch, U.S. Top Court Questions SEC’s Powers to Recover Ill-Gotten Profits, 23 No. 12
WESTLAW J. DERIVATIVES 2 (2017) (“Justice Neil Gorsuch . . . was even more blunt, complaining there was no
actual statute governing disgorgement and whether or not the money is paid out to victims or kept by the
government.”).
126
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Kokesh Footnote Three Notwithstanding: The Future of the Disgorgement
Penalty in SEC Cases, 56 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 17, 17 (2018) (“[T]he Court’s opinion actually cast
considerable doubt on the validity of the seemingly well-established disgorgement sanction.”).
127
140 S. Ct. 1936, 1941 (2020).
128
Id. at 1941.
129
Id. at 1941–42.
130
Id. at 1942.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 1939–40.
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was a remedy that was typically available in equity.135 Like the Second Circuit
in Cavanagh,136 the Court did not blithely focus on the recent origin of the word
disgorgement but instead inquired into the purpose behind the remedy.137 Their
analysis of jurisprudence revealed two important principles: “First, equity
practice long authorized courts to strip wrongdoers of their ill-gotten gains, with
scholars and courts using various labels for the remedy. Second, to avoid
transforming an equitable remedy into a punitive sanction, courts restricted the
remedy to an individual wrongdoer’s net profits to be awarded for victims.”138
Here, disgorging profits from Liu was acceptable as an equitable remedy,
but the lower courts made two mistakes. First, they needed to consider what
legitimate business expenses Liu sustained in building up the cancer research
center,139 as well as whether he and his wife were working in concert in the
fraudulent endeavor.140 The district court had assumed that the expenses “were
incurred for the purposes of furthering an entirely fraudulent scheme” and so
declined to deduct them.141 While this is fine if the expenses are simply
“wrongful gains ‘under another name,’” the lower courts must ascertain whether
they are legitimate to make sure the disgorgement award is allowed as an
equitable measure.142 Second, the common law rule insisted there should be
“individual liability for wrongful profits” and the SEC’s practice of joint liability
“could transform any equitable profits-focused remedy into a penalty.”143
However, because the “historic profits remedy” does allow liability for “partners
engaged in concerted wrongdoing,” the Court left it to the Ninth Circuit on
remand to determine whether facts indicated the married petitioners could,
“consistent with equitable principles, be found liable for profits as partners in
wrongdoing.”144
The petitioners made a third argument vis-à-vis disgorgement that is of
particular importance for this Comment: the SEC did not have power to disgorge

135

Id. at 1942.
SEC v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 118 (2d Cir. 2006).
137
Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1942 (2020). But see id. at 1951 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Disgorgement is not a
traditional form of equitable relief. Rather, cases, legal dictionaries, and treatises establish that it is a 20thcentury invention.”).
138
Id. at 1942 (majority opinion).
139
Id. at 1950. (“[S]ome expenses from petitioners’ scheme went toward lease payments and cancertreatment equipment. Such items arguably have value independent of fueling a fraudulent scheme.”).
140
Id. at 1949.
141
Id. at 1950.
142
Id. (quoting Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 788, 803 (1869)).
143
Id. at 1949.
144
Id.
136
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profits to the Treasury rather than to wronged investors.145 The Court reasoned
the SEC’s practice of depositing money disgorged from wrongdoers in the
Treasury rather than returning it to investors was “in considerable tension with
equity practices.”146 While Section 78u(d)(5) restricts equitable relief to the
measures that “may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors,”147
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act established a
fund that allowed disgorgement awards not returned to investors to go to one of
two other purposes: (1) paying whistleblowers who reported securities fraud, or
(2) funding the activities of the Inspector General.148 The Court emphasized that
Section 78u(d)(5) did not indicate whether this practice was “appropriate or
necessary” for investors and that, in equity, the profits remedy “generally
requires the SEC to return a defendant’s gains to wronged investors for their
benefit.”149 The SEC failed to point to any “analogous common-law remedy”
that allowed disgorging profits from a wrongdoer without actually disbursing
them to known victims.150 The Court also rejected the idea that simply denying
the wrongdoers of their profits is enough to make the measure “appropriate or
necessary.”151 If Congress had meant to allow the SEC to “simply benefit the
public at large by virtue of depriving a wrongdoer of ill-gotten gains,” it would
not have included the qualifier “appropriate or necessary” within Section
78u(d)(5).152
Despite dismissing these arguments, the Court signaled it may be
permissible for the SEC to deposit disgorged funds to the Treasury “where it is
infeasible to distribute the collected funds to investors.”153 Neither party had
“identified authorities revealing what traditional equitable principles govern
when . . . the wrongdoer’s profits cannot practically be disbursed to the

145

Id. at 1939.
Id. at 1946.
147
Id. at 1947 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) (2018)).
148
Id.; id. § 78u-6(g)(2) (“The Fund shall be available to the Commission, without further appropriation
or fiscal year limitation, for (A) paying awards to whistleblowers . . . [and] (B) funding the activities of the
Inspector General of the Commission.”).
149
Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1947–48 (citation omitted).
150
Id. at 1948.
151
Id. (“[T]he SEC’s equitable, profits-based remedy must do more than simply benefit the public at
large.”).
152
Id. at 1947–48; see also Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 253 (1993) (analyzing the similar
term “other appropriate equitable relief” under Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88
Stat. 832, as amended, 250 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(3)-(5)).
153
Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1948. In Liu the SEC had not returned funds to investors because the fraudsters had
allegedly “transferred the bulk of their misappropriated funds to China . . . and fled the United States.” Brief for
Respondent at 36, Liu, 140 S. Ct. 1936 (No. 18-1501).
146
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victims.”154 Because there was no specific order in the case directing disgorged
funds to the Treasury,155 the Court punted this decision to the lower courts on
remand to determine whether such an order would be for “the benefit of
investors as required by [Section] 78u(d)(5) and consistent with equitable
principles.”156 While Congress has returned to Section 78u(d) and provided
express statutory permission for the SEC to seek disgorgement as a remedy,157
questions surrounding the application of the law may require the SEC to
continue to argue that disgorgement abides by the requirements laid out in Liu.
Part III of this Comment argues that FCPA disgorgement does abide by the Liu
limitations.
III. DISGORGEMENT FOR FCPA VIOLATIONS IS APPROPRIATE, NECESSARY,
AND EQUITABLE
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Liu put the ability of the SEC to disgorge
profits at risk in two distinct categories: insider trading cases and FCPA cases.158
This Comment focuses specifically on Liu’s impact on FCPA enforcement.
Because Section 78u(d)(5) states that any equitable remedy must be “appropriate
or necessary for the benefit of investors,”159 the Court indicated that
disgorgement that returned money to the Treasury, rather than to wronged
investors, was in considerable tension with equity practices.160 The SEC
admitted in Liu that, in FCPA cases, there is usually no known “universe of
wronged investors” to whom money could be returned, and this money went to
the Treasury.161 Because Liu was not an FCPA case where money would
automatically be sent to the Treasury and there had been no specific order to
return money to the Treasury rather than wronged investors, the Court left it to
lower courts to determine if disgorgement to the Treasury was both consistent
with equitable practices and for the benefit of the investors.162 While the
language used by the Supreme Court will likely cause continued trepidation for

154

Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1948–49.
Id. at 1949.
156
Id.
157
Pub. L. No. 116-283 § 6501, 134 Stat. 3388 (2021).
158
See CADWALADER, supra note 11.
159
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5).
160
Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1946.
161
Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Liu v, 140 S. Ct. 1936 (No. 18-1501) (“[In] the FCPA cases . . .
sometimes we do get big judgments. They’re not returned to investors because there really is no obvious universe
of individual victims from an FCPA violation . . . .”).
162
Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1949.
155
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the SEC when pursuing disgorgement in FCPA cases,163 the lower courts should
interpret FCPA actions to disgorge to the Treasury as equitable, appropriate, and
necessary for the benefit of investors.164 Section A of this Part argues that
disgorgement is appropriate and necessary for the benefit of investors. This
section contends first, in the sphere of FCPA enforcement, that disgorgement is
necessary to effectuate the purposes of securities legislation. Second, this section
asserts that disgorgement is an appropriate remedy. Section B argues that
disgorgement in FCPA enforcement actions aligns with equitable principles.
A. Disgorgement Is Appropriate and Necessary for the Benefit of Investors
Disgorgement is a necessary remedy for FCPA enforcement because of the
difficulties associated with deterring acts of foreign bribery. Furthermore,
because disgorgement benefits not only the public at large but also specific
investors who are directly harmed by FCPA violations, it is an appropriate
remedy under Section 78u(d)(5). For disgorgement to be allowed under Section
78u(d)(5), it must be an equitable remedy that is “appropriate or necessary for
the benefit of investors.”165 In Liu, the Court rejected the idea that disgorgement
was appropriate or necessary simply because “the primary function of depriving
wrongdoers of profits is to deny them the fruits of their ill-gotten gains.”166
Because Congress included the qualifier “necessary or appropriate for the
benefit of investors” at the tail end of Section 78u(d)(5),167 for disgorgement to
be allowed as an equitable remedy, it “must do more than simply benefit the
public at large by virtue of depriving a wrongdoer of ill-gotten gains.”168
Disgorgement of ill-gotten gains for FCPA violations benefits the public at
large through deterrence.169 Deterring bribery benefits investors in rival
companies who adhere to the rule of law,170 foreign governments and persons
163
See CADWALADER, supra note 11 (“Companies should also press the SEC regarding its planned use
for disgorged funds and, if harmed investors cannot readily be identified, push back against the SEC’s claim for
disgorgement in that case.”).
164
See Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1949.
165
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) (2018).
166
Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1948.
167
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) (2018).
168
Id. (reasoning that, if the Court did not give effect to this phrase, it would violate the “cardinal principle
of interpretation that courts must give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute” (quoting Parker
Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Newton, 139 S. Ct. 1881, 1890 (2019))).
169
See Nick Oberheiden, 10 Reasons Why FCPA Compliance Is Critically Important for Businesses,
NAT’L L. REV. (July 24, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/10-reasons-why-fcpa-compliance-criticallyimportant-businesses.
170
See James Maton & Joshua W. Gardner, Suing Bribing Competitors: The Next Tool in the International
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who are negatively hurt by the corrupting effects of bribery,171 and the general
functioning of a free-market economy.172 However, importantly in the post-Liu
landscape, disgorgement benefits the specific investors who buy shares issued
by companies who trade on U.S. markets. While the SEC acknowledged that
there are no specific investors in FCPA cases to whom money can be returned,173
as in an action for restitution, research following Kokesh has made clear that
there are specific investors who are injured if disgorgement is not available to
remedy securities violations.174 For these investors, the inclusion of
disgorgement as an equitable remedy in FCPA enforcement actions is both
necessary and appropriate and provides distinct identifiable benefits. Subsection
One argues that deterrence of FCPA violations is necessary to protect investors.
Subsection Two further argues that it is appropriate.
1. Disgorgement Is a Necessary Deterrent
Disgorgement is a necessary deterrent that ensures corporations adhere to
strict accounting methods required by the FCPA and accompanying securities
laws. For shareholders to meaningfully invest in the stock market, they must be
knowledgeable about prospective investments, which is the reason SEC
disclosure requirements exist.175 However, Congress has realized, often after a
calamitous shock to the market caused by fraudulent behavior, that disclosure
requirements mean nothing if the agency lacks meaningful enforcement
mechanisms to ensure compliance. The Great Depression led to the passage of
the 1933 and 1934 Acts,176 the Watergate scandal led to the passage of the
FCPA,177 the Enron and WorldCom scandals led to the passage of SOX,178 and

Anti-Corruption Arsenal?, LEXOLOGY (May 15, 2008), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=
328309a6-3a12-44f0-a251-07ec5b82620c (describing the difficulty law abiding companies have in suing rival
companies due to lack of a private right of action under the FCPA).
171
See GILLIAN DELL, EXPORTING CORRUPTION PROGRESS REPORT 2020: ASSESSING ENFORCEMENT OF
THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION 21 (2020), https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/2020_Report_
ExportingCorruptionFull_English.pdf (arguing foreign bribery has adverse impacts on human rights and
negative impacts on state institutions).
172
Koehler, supra note 14, at 947.
173
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 161, at 34–35.
174
See infra Part III.A.2.
175
Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at Society of Corporate
Secretaries
&
Governance
Professionals
(July
11,
2013)
(available
at
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch071113dmghtm) (“The underlying premise of the Commission’s
disclosure regime is that if investors have the appropriate information, they can make rational and informed
investment decisions.”).
176
Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1639–40 (2017).
177
See Koehler, supra note 14, at 932.
178
See Kenton, supra note 79.
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the 2008 financial crisis led to the passage of Dodd-Frank and resulted in the
SEC’s power to grant whistleblowers bounty awards.179 Since the landmark
Texas-Gulf Sulphur case, in which a federal district court first granted the SEC
disgorgement in response to a securities violation,180 Congress has enacted six
different securities statutes that codified court-ordered disgorgement as a
remedy in SEC enforcement actions.181 With regards to SOX specifically, both
the legislative history surrounding the statute182 and President George W. Bush’s
State of the Union address calling for its implementation183 expressly referred to
the need to disgorge profits from wrongdoers. Prior to Liu, Congress did not
spell out that “disgorgement” was allowed as a remedy for the SEC in judicial
enforcement actions in the way that they have for other agencies, such as the
Federal Trade Commission. Yet, Congress has consistently referred to it
throughout legislation in a way that shows it intended that the SEC utilize it as
a remedy.184 And although the Supreme Court rejected the notion that
congressional awareness of prior SEC practices negated the qualifying language
of “appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors” in Section 78u(d)(5),185
the use of disgorgement in FCPA enforcement is necessary to effectuate
Congress’s desire to protect the public from further shocks to the market caused
by shady accounting practices.186 Both Congress and the courts recognized, even
before the creation of the FCPA or addition of Section 78u(d)(5), that the
purposes of the securities acts would be severely defeated if violators of the acts
“were allowed to retain the profits from [their] violation[s].”187 Because
179
See Donna M. Nagy, The Statutory Authority for Court-Ordered Disgorgement in SEC Enforcement
Actions, 71 SMU L. REV. 895, 917–18 (2018).
180
SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp 77, 92–94 (S.D.N.Y 1970).
181
See id. (arguing that these statutes, which include SOX, show congressional approval for equitable
disgorgement).
182
See Nagy, supra note 179, at 915 (arguing the legislative history of SOX shows that Congress both
“confirm[ed] the traditional remedy of court-ordered SEC disgorgement” and “provide[d] entirely new
authorization” for it).
183
The President’s 10-Point Plan: Improving Corporate Responsibility, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 6, 2002, 10:18
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1015460971646141720 (“Under this proposal, CEO bonuses and other
incentive-based forms of compensation would be disgorged in cases of accounting restatements resulting from
misconduct.”).
184
See Nagy, supra note 179, at 919; Gabaldon, supra note 102, at 54 (arguing the sloppiness of the federal
securities enforcement scheme’s creation is “strong—perhaps indisputable—evidence that Congress indeed
simply forgot to authorize disgorgement expressly”). The legislative changes to Section 78u(d) that expressly
allow for disgorgement support the argument that Congress always intended for the SEC to allow disgorgement
though Section 78u(d)(5). See infra Part IV.
185
Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1947 (2020).
186
See 148 CONG. REC. S6328 (2002) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes) (“[W]hat is transpiring is having a very
severe impact on hard-working American families. Corporate wrongdoing is being felt not just at the boardroom
table, but it is now being felt at the kitchen table as well.”).
187
See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1971).
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violators of the FCPA stand to gain windfalls far in excess of any statutorily
allowed civil penalties, the removal of disgorgement as a tool for the SEC would
severely defeat the purpose of the FCPA.188
Furthermore, given how difficult it is for the SEC to investigate FCPA
violations, disgorgement is particularly necessary to deter acts of bribery and
encourage U.S. issuers to implement strong accounting practices and
compliance programs.189 The difficulty in uncovering bribery abroad means that
FCPA violations take longer to investigate than other securities fraud cases.190
Accordingly, since the Kokesh holding that disgorgement is a penalty in the
context of the five-year statute of limitations,191 FCPA enforcement has been
particularly inhibited.192 Because the median length of time for companies to
resolve an FCPA enforcement action is four and a half years,193 many violators
may be able to evade disgorgement of at least a portion of their ill-gotten gains.
Bribery is markedly difficult to detect because neither the payer nor the
recipient of the bribe has any incentive to see their wrongdoing come to light.
Additionally, there is no direct victim, like in the case of an offering fraud where
an investor will have directly lost money in an identifiable way that would cause
them to come forward and disclose the crime.194 As a result, the SEC is
particularly reliant on self-disclosure to determine whether a company has
violated the FCPA, leading the agency to emphasize that reduced penalties and
non-prosecution agreements will not be recommended without cooperation.195
While there may still be incentives for companies to avoid the public spotlight

188
See Nerissa C. Brown, Brian Gale & Adrienna A. Huffman, Kokesh v. SEC: The Market Impact of
Reducing SEC Enforcement Powers 13 (Feb. 8, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file at https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3292548).
189
See Velikonja, supra note 59, at 435–36 (“If potential sanctions are lower, public firms and their
subsidiaries might invest less in compliance. . . . A somewhat larger share of investigations may not settle and
may result in litigation.”).
190
Id. at 414.
191
Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1639 (2017).
192
Velikonja, supra note 59, at 442. But see Mike Koehler, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Continuity in
a Transition Year, 70 S.C. L. REV. 143, 201 (2018) (“[S]tatute of limitations issues are meaningless when, as
often occurs, issuers under FCPA scrutiny waive statute of limitations defenses or agree to toll the statute of
limitations.”).
193
Gray Cloud, supra note 109.
194
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE DETECTION OF FOREIGN
BRIBERY 9 (2017), http://www.oecd.org/corruption/the-detection-of-foreign-bribery.htm; see, e.g., Press
Release, SEC Halts Alleged Ongoing Offering Fraud Involving Cycling Companies, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n
(July 22, 2021) (available at https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-136) (describing an offering fraud in
which a fraudster raised $11.5 million from at least forty investors).
195
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 194, at 19–20.
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of SEC enforcement trials where corporate leadership may be culpable,196 the
removal of disgorgement from the SEC’s toolbox would embolden those
companies who are already eager to push back against SEC enforcement actions
to do so with increased vigor.197 To dissuade issuers and their employees from
committing acts of bribery abroad, issuers must be incentivized through the
threat of disgorgement to keep accurate books and records and to report any
violations by wrong-doing employees.198 If there is no money to be made from
acts of bribery because disgorgement exists alongside other applicable civil and
criminal penalties, then companies will self-report.199
Consider a situation like that of Garth Peterson, the Morgan Stanley banker
who bribed a foreign official to secure business for Morgan Stanley while
enriching himself and his corrupt counterpart.200 Obviously, neither Peterson nor
the Chinese official he bribed for his and his employer’s gain would have
incentive to disclose their acts of bribery. Had Morgan Stanley not fully
cooperated with the SEC’s inquiry to discover Peterson’s misconduct, Peterson
would have likely gone on enriching himself, his corrupt foreign confederate,
and Morgan Stanley itself. Had Morgan Stanley not been disincentivized by the
possibility of disgorgement on top of the statutorily-limited civil penalties the
SEC could bring to bear, it may have chosen not to have voluntarily disclosed
the matter and not fully participated with the SEC inquiry.201 While executives
of issuers will likely still negotiate with the SEC and the Department of
Justice,202 given the possibility of injunctive consequences and even criminal
liability, removing the ability to disgorge profits makes violations of the FCPA
more likely.203

196
See Ben Protess & Matthew Goldstein, Overruled, Judge Still Left a Mark on S.E.C. Agenda, N.Y.
TIMES (June 4, 2014, 10:58 AM), https://nyti.ms/2irXEdK.
197
Wall Street Pushes Back on Foreign Bribery Probe, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 29, 2015, 7:24 PM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/wall-street-pushes-back-on-foreign-bribery-probe-1430349863.
198
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 194, at 27.
199
See FCPA 101, supra note 15 (“In recent years, the majority of corporate FCPA enforcement actions
(and related individual enforcement actions) have resulted from voluntary disclosures.”).
200
See supra Introduction.
201
See Frances Floriano Goins, Rigorous Compliance Program Supports the “Rogue Employee” Defense
to FCPA Liability, LEXOLOGY (June 6, 2012), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=153ff381-a4394940-94da-baf27f06ae42.
202
See Wall Street Pushes Back on Foreign Bribery Probe, supra note 197.
203
See DeLuca, supra note 106, at 913.

CHOHONIS_2.21.22

2022]

2/21/2022 8:56 AM

PATCHING THE HOLES IN SOX

865

Further, while there have been both international efforts204 and efforts by
foreign governments to legislate against bribery abroad,205 such efforts have
been implemented in too piecemeal and irregular a fashion to replace the
FCPA’s strong deterrent effect.206
2. Disgorgement Is Appropriate and Benefits Investors
Disgorgement is an appropriate remedy for investors under Section
78u(d)(5) because disgorgement benefits investors who have been harmed by a
company’s failure to maintain accounting standards or an individual employee’s
actual act of bribery. First, it bears repeating that the act of disgorgement itself
does benefit the public at large because it deters violations of the FCPA.
Corruption, if allowed to continue, damages the rule of law, harms government
legitimacy, and impairs the natural development of less affluent countries.207
When attributed to American issuers, it damages the credibility of both
American businesses and American foreign policy.208 Yet, the Court made clear
in Liu that disgorgement must do more than benefit the public at large to be an
appropriate or necessary remedy under Section 78u(d)(5).209 Specifically, the
Court made clear that the deterrent effect of “depriving wrongdoers of profits”
is not enough to make disgorgement “appropriate or necessary for the benefit of
investors.”210 The “remedy must do more.”211
The aftermath of the Court’s ruling in Kokesh has revealed that the ability to
disgorge profits does more than simply benefit the general public. It specifically
benefits those investors who invest in companies that face disgorgement as a
consequence of FCPA violations. Recall that Kokesh’s labeling of disgorgement
as a penalty limited enforcement actions to five years because of statute of

204
See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CONVENTION ON COMBATING
BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 3 (1998).
205
See DELL, supra note 171, at 29–31.
206
Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks to the Economic Club of New York
(Sept. 9, 2019) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-clayton-2019-09-09) (“[I]n
many areas of the world, our work may not be having the desired effect . . . because many other countries,
including those that have long had similar offshore anti-corruption laws on their books, do not enforce these
laws.”).
207
Steven R. Salbu, Redeeming Extraterritorial Bribery and Corruption Laws, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 641, 642
(2017).
208
See Koehler, supra note 14, at 942; cf. Brewster, supra note 25, at 1626 (arguing Congress and President
Carter were concerned that “illicit corporate payments abroad” harmed U.S. relations with other countries).
209
Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1948 (2020).
210
Id.
211
Id.
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limitations restrictions.212 This ruling severely curtailed the SEC’s ability to
disgorge profits, particularly in the realm of FCPA enforcements, which often
take longer than five years to come to light.213 The SEC estimated in 2019 that
the decision had caused them “to forgo over 1.1 billion dollars in disgorgement,”
and that as a result they had shifted their resources to investigate violations that
offered the highest chance of returning funds to investors.214 While the erosion
of the SEC’s ability to disgorge profits after Kokesh was bad for the SEC’s
ability to pursue long-running frauds, it did offer researchers a unique
opportunity to conduct an empirical study to analyze the effect of disgorgement
on the value of shares of issuers who are subject to securities laws.215
Researchers looked at the Eleventh Circuit, which had already viewed
disgorgement as limited by the statute of limitations, as a control group and
compared it to the remaining circuits that had not yet limited disgorgement by
the statute of limitations.216 Conclusively, the researchers found that the erosion
of the SEC’s ability to disgorge funds had a deleterious effect on shareholder
confidence and stock prices.217 As a result of the Kokesh decision, surveyed
companies saw an “aggregate loss[] of $33.22 billion.”218 The mere limitation
of disgorgement as a tool for enforcement of securities legislation caused severe
investor anxiety and indicated disgorgement was a value-adding tool that
investors wanted because of its beneficial effects.219
B. Disgorgement to the Treasury Aligns with Equitable Principles
While disgorgement is necessary and appropriate to effectuate the purpose
of the FCPA and the subsequent additions to it, such as SOX and the DoddFrank whistleblower provisions,220 it is less clear how disgorgement fits in with
equitable principles. In part, this is due to the murky nature of the equitable-legal
divide.221 It is also due to the Court’s vacillating guidance as to how a court

212

Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1644 (2017).
Gray Cloud, supra note 109.
214
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT: DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT 21 (2019), https://
www.sec.gov/files/enforcement-annual-report-2019.pdf.
215
Brown et al., supra note 188, at 2–4.
216
Id. at 4.
217
Id. at 24–26.
218
Id. at 3.
219
Id. at 30.
220
See Nagy, supra note 179, at 919.
221
Gabaldon, supra note 102, at 1615 (arguing that “a sea of unexamined assumptions about ‘equity’” has
led to confusion). But cf. Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. L. REV. 997, 1001
(2015) (arguing “the Court has constructed an idealized history of equity that is well suited to judicial
decisionmaking”).
213
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should discern whether a remedy is equitable.222 This section asserts that despite
the murky context, FCPA disgorgement does align with equitable principles
identified by the Court in Liu.
First, disgorgement is an equitable measure because it adheres to the
principle that courts are allowed in equity “to strip wrongdoers of their ill-gotten
gains, with scholars and courts using various labels for the remedy.”223 In Liu,
eight Supreme Court justices, excluding Justice Thomas, agreed with the
commonsense idea that the name of a remedy mattered less than what it
effectively did.224 In other words, that FCPA disgorgement actions strip
individuals and corporations of their ill-gotten gains fits squarely within the
definition of equitable principles.225
Second, FCPA disgorgement is equitable despite the Court’s finding that “to
avoid transforming an equitable remedy into a punitive sanction, courts restrict[]
the remedy . . . to be awarded for victims.”226 Since FCPA disgorgement returns
money to the Treasury rather than awarding the remedy to victims, it might seem
the Court is signaling to lower courts that FCPA disgorgement is not equitable.
However, because the Court also indicated that “[t]he equitable nature of the
profits remedy generally requires the SEC to return a defendant’s gains to
wronged investors for their benefit,” the Court left open the possibility that some
disgorgement to the Treasury could be equitable.227
Although debatable,228 the Court held that a punitive remedy cannot be
equitable.229 To determine whether a remedy is equitable rather than punitive,
the lower courts could employ two distinct methods indicated in Supreme Court
precedent.230 The first method requires a historic survey like the Court conducted
in Grupo, in which lower courts should look to the English Court of Chancery
to see if, at the time of the Judiciary Act of 1789, those courts had the ability to
pursue the particular remedy in question.231 If one employs this approach in the

222

See Bray, supra note 221, at 999–1001.
Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1942 (2020).
224
See id. at 1942–43.
225
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, at §§ 51(3)–(4).
226
Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1942.
227
Id. at 1948 (emphasis added).
228
Gabaldon, supra note 102, at 1649–50 (discussing “the ‘[p]ower of a court of equity to inflict
punishment’”); see HENRY HOME, LORD KAMES, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 263 (Michael Lobban ed., 3d ed. 2014)
(1760).
229
See Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1941, 1949–50.
230
Gabaldon, supra note 102, at 1614–15.
231
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. All. Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308, 327, 332 (1999).
223

CHOHONIS_2.21.22

868

2/21/2022 8:56 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:841

rigidly formalistic way that the majority did in Grupo,232 it is difficult to see how
FCPA disgorgement is an equitable remedy. Justice Thomas followed the rigidly
formalistic, historic approach of the Grupo majority in his dissent in Liu and
argued that because the word “disgorgement” was not used prior to 1789, it
should have been disallowed completely as an equitable remedy.233 Justice
Thomas asserted that, even if one allowed disgorgement generally,
disgorgement certainly is not equitable when money is not returned to wronged
victims, like when the SEC disgorges ill-gotten gains from FCPA violators.234
However, at least one circuit court has used this approach relying on pre-1789
sources in a less textualist manner and held that disgorgement generally is
equitable because its central purpose is to prevent unjust enrichment.235 So while
there may be no analogous cases in which the government seized money from
wrongdoers with the specific intention of placing it in government coffers,236 the
emphasis that eighteenth-century writers, such as Lord Kames, placed on
equity’s purpose of preventing ill-gotten gains237 should lead more functionalist
courts to find that SEC FCPA disgorgement is sufficiently analogous to historic
remedies to pass muster.238
The second approach for analyzing equitable measures, as embraced in postGrupo holdings by the Supreme Court, indicates that even staunch originalists
are willing to discard reliance on pre-1789 sources to analyze the equitable
nature of a remedy.239 While Justice Thomas240 stood up for the Grupo approach
in Liu and argued that disgorgement should be analyzed by how courts in 1789
would view the measure,241 the majority in Liu eschewed reliance on pre-1789

232
Id. at 332 (“[T]he equitable powers conferred by the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not include the power
to create remedies previously unknown to equity jurisprudence.”).
233
Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1951 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
234
Id. at 1956 (“Requiring the SEC to only ‘generally’ compensate victims . . . is inconsistent with
traditional equitable principles.”).
235
SEC v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 118 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Commentators have observed that courts of
equity now have, and have had for centuries, jurisdiction over claims arising from improper acquisition of
assets.”).
236
Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1955–56 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
237
See Gabaldon, supra note 102, at 1657–58.
238
See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. All. Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308, 336 (1999) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“From the beginning, we have defined the scope of federal equity in relation to the principles of
equity existing at the separation of this country from England . . . [W]e have never limited the federal equity
jurisdiction to the specific practices and remedies of the pre-Revolutionary Chancellor.”).
239
See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 217 (2002) (explaining that
consulting current works should “make the answer clear” as to whether a remedy is equitable).
240
See Michael O’Donnell, Deconstructing Clarence Thomas, THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 2019, at 39, 39–41,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/09/deconstructing-clarence-thomas/594775/.
241
Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1951 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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sources and looked to modern restatements on equity for guidance.242 This
approach had been approved by Justice Scalia himself in the 2002 Great-West
& Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson decision.243 This more flexible second
approach allows courts to analyze statutes based on the understanding of equity
at the time they were written, rather than analyzing equity frozen in time at the
moment of the nation’s founding.244 As has been stated by Justice Barrett, the
most recent textualist justice appointed to the Supreme Court, “the judge
approaches the text as it was written, with the meaning it had at the time.”245
Interpreting a statute written in 2002 in the way legislators at the time would
have understood it is a more appropriate approach than peering back in time to
1789.246 If the lower courts use this approach rather than imitating historians,247
then they will find it even easier to hold that FCPA disgorgement is equitable.
In Great-West, the Court held that Section 502(a)(3) of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which allowed, in part, a civil action
to “obtain other appropriate equitable relief,” did not include judicially-decreed
reimbursement for payments made to a beneficiary of an insurance plan by a
third party because it was not equitable relief.248 In a 5-4 decision, Justice
Scalia’s majority held that this action was a legal remedy and therefore not
equitable.249 Although this analysis still relied on a historical analysis of the
Court’s equitable powers, the Court did not perform an “antiquarian inquiry”
that relied on pre-constitutional cases from the English Court of Chancery like
it had done in Grupo.250 Here, the Court instead looked to modern sources such
as restatements and treatises for guidance.251 The majority argued these modern
sources showed that restitutionary measures that sought to impose liability on
242

Id. at 1943 (majority opinion).
534 U.S. at 217.
244
Even a textualist who opposes the use of legislative history to discover congressional intent could
accept the use of contemporary sources to discern congressional meaning. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role
of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 61 (1988) (“Meaning comes from
the ring the words would have had to a skilled user of words at the time, thinking about the same problem.”);
Gabaldon, supra note 102, at 1658 (“[W]hen one is deriving the meaning of modern statutes it is more
appropriate to rely on Professor Dan Dobbs than on Lord Kames.”).
245
Brian Naylor, Barrett, An Originalist, Says Meaning of Constitution ‘Doesn’t Change Over Time,’
NPR (Oct. 13, 2020, 10:08 AM), https://www.npr.org/923215778.
246
See Bray, supra note 221, at 1012 (“[I]t is difficult to make 1789 bear the weight of being an originalist
year for the enactment of equitable doctrines.”); cf. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 163
U.S. 564, 600–01 (1896) (noting the expansion of equitable remedies).
247
See MAX RADIN, LAW AS LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE 138 (2000) (“[L]awyers are . . . extremely bad
historians.”).
248
Great-West, 534 U.S. at 209–10 (citations omitted).
249
Id. at 220–21.
250
Id. at 217.
251
Id. at 212–13.
243
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the defendant were legal, whereas those that sought “to restore to the plaintiff
particular funds or property in the defendant’s possession” were equitable.252
While on its face this decision seems to imply that restitutionary measures
such as disgorgement that address unjust enrichment—as in the FCPA cases—
would be legal remedies rather than equitable ones, Justice Scalia also noted in
a footnote that restitutionary remedies could address unjust enrichment when it
involves breaches of fiduciary duties.253 The Supreme Court’s holding in Liu
that disgorgement is not limited to breaches of fiduciary duty,254 taken alongside
Justice Scalia’s footnote in Great-West, implies that the breadth of equitable
remedies is larger when it seeks to disgorge the illicit profits obtained by those
who breach their fiduciary duties.255 Importantly, FCPA violations of both the
anti-bribery provisions and the books and records provisions often involve
violations of fiduciary duties.256 For example, in the Peterson case, both Peterson
and Morgan Stanley owed fiduciary duties to their clients.257 Those duties were
breached by Peterson through his acts of bribery and misappropriation,258 and
arguably would have been breached by Morgan Stanley had the threat of
disgorgement and concomitant penalties not incentivized the company to
establish strong internal controls.259 Further, the idea that wrongdoers and those
who breach fiduciary duties should be deprived of their ill-gotten gains squares
with the current Restatement of the Law, the exact type of source used in GreatWest and cited approvingly in Liu.260 The Restatement (Third) of Restitution and
Unjust Enrichment specifically signals that eliminating the possibility of profit
by “a conscious wrongdoer, or . . . a defaulting fiduciary”261 is “one of the
cornerstones of the law of restitution and unjust enrichment.”262
Admittedly, even though the presence of a breach of fiduciary duties
broadens the availability of the equitable remedy, as this Comment argues, such
252

Id. at 214.
Id. at 214 n.2.
254
Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1944 (2020).
255
See Gabaldon, supra note 102, at 1656.
256
See Mike Koehler, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Ripples, 3 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 391, 434–37 (2014).
257
Complaint at 2–3, SEC v. Peterson, 2012 WL 1440462 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2012) (No. 12CV 02033).
258
Id. at 2.
259
See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 39, at 43 (describing a situation in which a company failed to have
adequate controls over employees in China who committed acts of bribery and was forced to pay $1.15 million
in disgorgement).
260
See Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1943, 1950 (2020). But see id. at 1953 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The
inclusion of ‘disgorgement’ in the Third Restatement . . . represents a ‘novel extension’ of equity.” (citation
omitted)).
261
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51(4) (AM. L. INST. 2010).
262
Id. § 51 cmt. e.
253

CHOHONIS_2.21.22

2022]

2/21/2022 8:56 AM

PATCHING THE HOLES IN SOX

871

circumstances alone may still not be enough to overcome the Court’s hesitation
to grant the SEC disgorgement when some of the money disgorged is to be
returned to the Treasury.263 However, in addition to the broadening effect that
breaches of fiduciary duties have on what can be considered equitable, the Court
has signaled that equitable remedies can also be broadened when they are used
to address a public wrong rather than a private wrong. This is particularly
pertinent in the context of violations of the FCPA, as the Act does not provide
for a private right of action.264 While both Grupo and Great-West looked at the
availability of equitable measures generally, neither looked at disgorgement
specifically, and both analyzed efforts to enforce equitable remedies through
private causes of action.265 Accordingly, these precedents “are only tangentially
relevant to the issue of court-ordered disgorgement in SEC enforcement
actions.”266 In the context of securities violations that allow for private causes of
action, Liu’s finding that equitable measures should generally return money to
wronged investors makes sense.267 Those injured by securities fraud should
receive the money that the wrongdoer secured, if possible. For example, when
investors are defrauded, the investors often stand ready to bring suit to ensure
that the wrongdoer does not benefit from his ill-gotten gains,268 even if the SEC
or another enforcement agency does not bring suit.269 These disgorged funds
should be returned to the victims, who had their own private right of action,
instead of the government. However, when the SEC seeks disgorgement to
enforce a public right, as in an FCPA case where there is no private cause of
action, sending money to the Treasury is equitable because it serves the purpose
of depriving a wrongdoer of her ill-gotten gains.270

263

See Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1942 (noting the limited equitable rewards to be awarded to victims).
See Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1024 (6th Cir. 1990) (“[W]e find that no private right
of action is available under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.”); Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG, 768 F.3d 145,
169–70 (2d Cir. 2014).
265
In Grupo, the request for restitution as an equitable remedy was brought by a private investment fund
for a breach of contract issue. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. All. Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308, 310, 312 (1999).
In Great-West, an insurance company sued for an injunction for a money judgment, which the Court viewed as
a breach of contract issue. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 208, 213 (2002).
266
Nagy, supra note 179, at 921.
267
Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1948.
268
See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 378, 380 (1983) (holding that defrauded
investors’ private right of action under the 1934 Act “is simply beyond peradventure”).
269
Private litigants, however, are less successful than the SEC in recovering losses. See Urska Velikonja,
Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC’s Fair Fund Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV.
331, 373 (2015).
270
See Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1942.
264
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In Porter v. Warner Holding Co., the Court held that restitution was
equitable when it came to the enforcement of public rights.271 Porter, which was
cited approvingly in both Kokesh272 and Liu,273 looked at the powers of equity
available to federal courts generally and held that it was “readily apparent” that
a district court had the power to compel one to “disgorge profits” acquired in
violation of a federal statute.274 That “the public interest is involved” meant a
court’s exercise of its inherent equitable powers “assume[d] an even broader and
more flexible character than when only a private controversy is at stake.”275 Like
the need to disgorge the profits of FCPA violators addressed in this Comment,
the Porter Court viewed the deterrent effect of disgorging the wrongdoer of illgotten gains as “appropriate and necessary” to effectuating that public
interest.276
Just five years before Liu, in Kansas v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court
approvingly cited Porter’s proposition that a court’s inherent equitable powers
were “broader and more flexible” when a public interest was involved.277 In
Kansas v. Nebraska, Kansas and Nebraska had an interstate compact that set
limitations on how much water each state could draw from the Republican River
Basin, which Nebraska violated by pumping excess groundwater.278 This
exposed Kansas to a risk of diminished water levels, and the state brought suit.279
Like in Great-West, the Court avoided reliance on antiquarian case law from
1789 and instead turned to modern restatements for guidance on what was
equitable.280 Justice Kagan’s five-justice majority held that Nebraska’s upstream
access to the river meant that, without judicial intervention, it would be able to
appropriate all the water before it made its way into Kansas.281 The Court
addressed this issue as if it were one of unjust enrichment, ordering

271

328 U.S. 395, 398–99 (1946).
Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1644 (2017).
273
Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1943 (2020) (citing Porter for the proposition that the disgorgement of
profits is equitable).
274
Porter, 328 U.S. at 398–99.
275
Id. at 398.
276
Id. at 400 (“[A] restitution order is appropriate and necessary to enforce compliance with the Act and
to give effect to its purposes. Future compliance may be more definitely assured if one is compelled to restore
one’s illegal gains . . . .”).
277
Kansas v. Nebraska, 574 U.S. 445, 456 (2015) (quoting Porter, 328 U.S. at 398).
278
Id. at 451–52.
279
Id. at 452.
280
Id. at 455. But cf. id. at 475 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing modern restatements must be “used with
caution”).
281
Id. at 454 (majority opinion) (holding that judicial power was the “only means left” for stopping the
inequitable taking of the water (quoting Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 144 (1902))).
272
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disgorgement not because of any actual losses that Kansas had suffered but
instead because “compelling Nebraska to disgorge profits deter[red] it from
taking advantage of its upstream position.”282 Chief Justice Roberts concurred
that the Court had equitable power to order disgorgement.283 Further, Justice
Thomas, who would decry the nature of disgorgement as equitable when
disgorgement enforced private rights in Liu,284 allowed it here as an equitable
remedy.285 Since this section of Justice Thomas’s opinion was joined by Justices
Scalia and Alito, all the Justices involved in the Kansas decision viewed
disgorgement as equitable when a federal interest was at stake.286
Kansas v. Nebraska, as it relates to FCPA disgorgement, is important for
two reasons. First, it demonstrates that there is a difference in how the Court
views the equitable powers of the Court when it seeks to enforce a public right
as compared to a private right.287 Every justice on the Kansas v. Nebraska Court
appeared to agree that the presence of a public interest meant disgorgement was
equitable.288 Second, the rationale behind the need for disgorgement in an FCPA
case is strikingly similar to the rationale behind the need for disgorgement in
Kansas v. Nebraska. To deter a wrongdoer from taking advantage of their
“upstream position” to secure wealth at the cost of their rivals, courts have the
power to disgorge the profits of the wrongdoer. As long as the disgorgement
granted by a court complies with the limitations identified in Liu, such as
individual liability for wrongful profits and deduction of legitimate expenses,289
it would still be the type of equitable remedy allowed by the Porter and Kansas
v. Nebraska decisions, notwithstanding the ultimate destination of the disgorged
funds. While disgorgement would still be a deterrent, it would not be punitive
such that it would transform from an equitable measure into a legal remedy and
thus fall outside the scope of the court’s equitable powers.290
Finally, disgorging money to the Treasury for FCPA violations does not
prevent victims from recovering a fraudster’s ill-gotten gains. Essentially, this
282
Id. at 475. The Court further reasoned that if they were to only award actual damages it would allow
Nebraska “‘to ignore its obligation to deliver water as long as it is willing’ to pay that amount.” Id. at 463
(quoting Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 132 (1987)).
283
Id. at 475 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
284
Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1956 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
285
See Kansas v. Nebraska, 574 U.S. at 485 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(likening disgorgement to other kinds of equitable power).
286
Gabaldon, supra note 102, at 1660.
287
Id. (“[T]here is a clear and continuing tonal difference between the Court’s public interest equitable
remedy cases and its private interest equitable remedy cases . . . .”).
288
See id.
289
Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1949–50.
290
See id. at 1944.
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negates one of Justice Thomas’s main concerns in Liu. Justice Thomas posited
that allowing disgorgement to go to the Treasury in cases such as Liu, where a
fraudster had actually defrauded identifiable victims, would mean that there
would be no money left for the actual victims of the fraud.291 He complained
that the majority’s requirement that the SEC should only “‘generally’
compensate victims” left the lower courts with “almost no guidance . . . about
how to resolve this question on remand.”292 He further lamented that the Court
“should at least do more to identify the circumstances in which the government
may keep the money.”293 One such circumstance is in the context of FCPA
disgorgement. While this Comment contends that there are indeed victims of
FCPA violations, such as investors and rival companies,294 there are not specific
identifiable investors to whom money can be returned.295 Because no private
cause of action for FCPA violations exists (as in a 10b-5 cause of action),296
disgorging money from wrongdoers to the Treasury does not threaten to deplete
a wrongdoer of funds in a way that would deprive private litigants from
recovering that money.
Moving forward, lower courts should view FCPA disgorgement actions by
the SEC as fulfilling the requirements laid out by the Supreme Court in Liu.
They are appropriate and necessary for the benefit of investors. The ability to
disgorge profits is necessary for the SEC to effectuate the purposes of an
amalgamation of statutes aimed at preventing wrongdoers from committing acts
of bribery and books and record violations that threaten the entire functioning of
the financial system. That the U.S. enforcement agencies largely act alone to
detect and deter these acts of bribery makes the presence of an effective deterrent
like disgorgement particularly important.
Further, the ability to disgorge profits is appropriate. In addition to the
general idea that battling the pernicious effect of corruption has a positive effect
on the general public by improving the rule of law, government legitimacy, the
development of affluent countries, and the credibility of American issuers, it also
benefits the specific investors who have purchased shares from these issuers.
291
Id. at 1954 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he imposition of over $26 million in disgorgement and
approximately $8 million in civil monetary penalties . . . ensure[s] that victims will be unable to recover anything
in their own actions.”).
292
Id. at 1956.
293
Id.
294
See supra notes 170, 215.
295
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 161, at 34 (stating that if the money goes to the Treasury,
then “we don’t really know if it’s being used to help investors”).
296
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (stating that a private right of action
under § 10(b) “has been consistently recognized for more than 35 years”).
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The effect the Kokesh decision had on the SEC’s ability to disgorge funds
showed that limiting this remedy harmed the interests of those specific investors
who have purchased shares from these issuers.
In addition to being both appropriate and necessary, disgorging funds for
violations of the FCPA aligns with equitable principles, whether the lower courts
look back to the English Court of Chancery or, more prudently, to modern
restatements and writings on equity. Both types of sources demonstrate that one
of the central principles of equity is stripping wrongdoers of their ill-gotten
gains. Further, Supreme Court precedent shows support for the proposition that
the equitable powers of the federal courts are broadened when breaches of
fiduciary duties are involved and when the court is seeking to enforce a public
right.297 Both phenomena are present in a case of a FCPA violation leading to
disgorgement. Finally, while the principles of equity generally require that funds
be returned to victims, the fact that FCPA disgorgement efforts do not threaten
to deprive wrongdoers of funds that might otherwise go to victims in a private
cause of action is strong support for allowing the SEC to continue to disgorge
these funds from wrongdoers. To hold otherwise would threaten the entire
purpose for which Congress passed the FCPA, SOX, Dodd-Frank, and litany of
other related securities legislation.
Despite the argument made in this section that the lower courts can disgorge
profits as an equitable remedy in FCPA actions, there is considerable uncertainty
about what the lower courts will do.298 This uncertainty is further compounded
by post-Liu changes to Section 78u(d), which, while expressly granting the SEC
the power to disgorge profits and raising the statute of limitations in some
instances, have an uncertain and uneven application for FCPA enforcement
actions. The uncertainty caused by these revisions means that the SEC may need
to continue to justify disgorgement to the Treasury in some, or even all,
instances. These changes and their implications are discussed in Part IV below.

297
See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 214 n.2 (2002); Porter v. Warner
Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 403 (1946).
298
Compare Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1956 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]his uncertainty is sure to create
opportunities for the SEC to continue exercising unlawful power.”), with Kyle DeYoung, Lex Urban & Wesley
Wintermyer, An Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Liu v. SEC, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (July 4, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/07/04/an-analysis-of-the-supreme-courtsdecision-in-liu-v-sec (arguing that unless the SEC can “justify sending disgorged funds to the Treasury,” it
“would undoubtedly reduce the amount of disgorgement the agency is able to obtain in future enforcement
actions”).

CHOHONIS_2.21.22

876

2/21/2022 8:56 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:841

IV. CONGRESS’S GRANT OF EXPRESS AUTHORITY TO DISGORGE CREATES
NEW QUESTIONS
The limitations imposed on the SEC by the Court’s Kokesh and Liu decisions
had huge impacts on the SEC’s ability to disgorge funds and, by extension, to
protect investors. In 2019, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton warned that the
limitations imposed by Kokesh’s statute of limitations requirement “may cause
the Commission to forgo up to approximately $900 million in disgorgement in
filed cases, of which a substantial amount potentially could have been returned
to retail investors.”299 Kokesh limited the SEC’s ability to rectify “long-running,
well-concealed frauds,” and Clayton “welcome[ed] the opportunity to work with
Congress to address this gap in investor protection.”300 The House of
Representatives soon thereafter approved a bill that would have expressly
granted the SEC the ability to disgorge funds and increased the statute of
limitations for these enforcement actions to fourteen years.301 Because the bill
never made it out of the Senate,302 the statute of limitations for disgorgement
actions remained at five years at the time of Liu’s imposition of further
limitations on the SEC’s ability to disgorge funds as an equitable remedy.303
Following Liu, Clayton again requested Congress’s help, emphasizing that
disgorgement “is one of the Commission’s most important tools” and stressing
that “more than $1 billion in ill-gotten gains” had escaped the SEC’s reach since
the Kokesh decision.304
In the waning days of 2020, Congress finally came to the rescue. Congress
modified the language of Section 78u to expressly grant the SEC the power to
disgorge funds and raised the statute of limitations to ten years for some—but
crucially not all—violations of securities laws.305 The modifications to the
SEC’s powers, buried on page 1,328 of the unexpectedly politically

299
Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Remarks at the Mid-Atlantic Regional
Conference (June 4, 2019) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/clayton-keynote-midatlantic-regional-conference-2019).
300
Id.
301
Investor Protection and Capital Markets Fairness Act, H.R. 4344, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019).
302
Securities Fraud Enforcement and Investor Compensation Act of 2019, S. 799, 116th Cong.
303
See Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1949–50 (explaining how joint and several liability and inclusion of legitimate
business expenses could transform an equitable remedy into a punitive one).
304
Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Testimony on “Oversight of the Securities and
Exchange Commission” Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Nov. 17,
2020) (transcript available at https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Clayton%20Testimony%201117-202.pdf).
305
William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, H.R. 6395,
116th Cong. § 6501(C)(3) (2020) (enacted).
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contentious306 $740.5 billion National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA),
arguably frees the SEC from the limitations imposed by Kokesh and Liu.307
However, because of the murky language of the bill and the even murkier
presence of scienter as an element to be proved in FCPA actions, courts will
continue to have a difficult time setting the boundaries for the SEC’s power.
Section A of this Part explains how the legislation altered the SEC’s ability to
disgorge profits and how the statute of limitations applies. This section identifies
questions raised by these provisions that courts will need to address, particularly
as they apply to FCPA enforcement actions. Section B discusses what changes
should be included in subsequent revisions to the statute, and argues that the best
way of ensuring that SEC enforcement efforts are not overly onerous to
suspected wrongdoers is not through the imposition of a short statute of
limitations, but rather through sufficient funding of the SEC. This should be
done by allowing the agency to fund itself through disgorgement rather than rely
on congressional appropriations.
A. How the NDAA Alters Section 78u(d)
The NDAA made two significant changes to Section 78u(d) that are of
importance to the SEC’s ability to disgorge funds from those who commit
violations of the FCPA. First, Section 6501 of the NDAA expressly gives the
SEC the ability to disgorge funds from wrongdoers.308 This express authority to
disgorge should be interpreted to allow courts to grant disgorgement free of the
limitations imposed by the Court in Liu. This will be discussed in Subsection
One below. Second, Section 6501 dictates the exact statute of limitations
requirements for violations of specific provisions of the act or for violations of
securities laws that have a specific element that must be proven.309 As a result
of these changes, whether the SEC has five years or ten years to disgorge funds
is dictated by the type of securities law violation that has occurred.310 This
provision will lead to new legal challenges because it does not explicitly point
to the FCPA as a provision entitled to a ten-year statute of limitations, and the
306
President Trump vetoed the bill because it changed the names of military sites named after
Confederates and it did not repeal language protecting social media companies’ liability protections. The support
for the bill was so strong that Congress overrode the veto, the only time an override happened in Trump’s
presidency. See Catie Edmondson, Senate Overrides Trump’s Veto of Defense Bill, Dealing a Legislative Blow,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2021), https://nyti.ms/3o8jSAL.
307
See Congress Buries Expansion of SEC Disgorgement Authority in Annual Defense Budget, GIBSON
DUNN (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.gibsondunn.com/congress-buries-expansion-of-sec-disgorgement-authority-inannual-defense-budget/.
308
William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act § 6501(a)(1)(A).
309
Id.
310
Id.

CHOHONIS_2.21.22

878

2/21/2022 8:56 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:841

existence of scienter as an element in FCPA actions is variable and uncertain.
These changes are discussed in Subsection Two below.
1. Section 78u(d) Now Allows the SEC to Disgorge Funds Which May Free
It of Liu’s Restrictions
In Liu, the SEC argued that Congress, aware that the SEC had been
disgorging funds as an equitable measure since the time of Texas Gulf, impliedly
meant to allow the agency to continue using this remedy by including the phrase
“any equitable relief” in Section 78u(d)(5).311 As discussed above,312 the
Supreme Court soundly rejected the idea, reasoning that because the statute
referenced “a remedy grounded in equity,” the disgorgement remedy must have
been available in courts of equity and must contain the limitations “that equity
typically imposes.”313 Section 6501 of the NDAA quickly and expressly made
clear that whatever Congress’s position was prior to the Liu decision about
whether the SEC could seek and courts could grant disgorgement, Congress
certainly condoned the practice now.
First, the title of Section 78u(d)(3) was changed from “Money penalties in
civil actions” to “Civil money penalties and authority to grant disgorgement.”314
Importantly, the bill added a new provision—paragraph (7).315 This paragraph
reads as follows: “In any action or proceeding brought by the Commission under
any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal
court may order, disgorgement.”316 The bill also explicitly granted courts
jurisdiction to “require disgorgement under paragraph (7) of any unjust
enrichment by the person who received such unjust enrichment as a result of
such violation.”317 While the Supreme Court in Liu held that disgorgement
would be allowed as an equitable remedy,318 albeit with some limitations, the
SEC can now point to express statutory authority to disgorge funds from those
who unjustly enriched themselves through violations of securities laws such as
311
See Brief for Respondent, supra note 153, at 10 (arguing that given Congress’s subsequent enactment
of “five separate statutes that referred to or relied on the availability of disgorgement in civil suits brought by
the SEC,” “it is implausible to suggest that the sweeping phrase ‘any equitable relief’ was intended to withhold
the equitable remedy of disgorgement”).
312
See supra Part II.C.
313
Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1947.
314
William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act § 6501(a)(1)(A) (i)–(ii).
315
Id. § 6501(a)(3).
316
Id.
317
Id. § 6501(a)(1)(B)(ii). The new statute also explained that these funds could not be used to pay attorney
fees. See id. § 6501(a)(2) (changing § 78u(d)(4) to include funds disgorged under the new § 78u(d)(7) provision).
318
See Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1940 (holding “that a disgorgement award that does not exceed a wrongdoer’s
net profits . . . is equitable relief permissible under § 78(d)(5)”).

CHOHONIS_2.21.22

2022]

2/21/2022 8:56 AM

PATCHING THE HOLES IN SOX

879

the FCPA. Whether this express authority frees the SEC from the limitations on
disgorgement imposed by the Liu decision is an open question.319
Although the legislative changes to Section 78u(d) expressly allowing
disgorgement are better than leaving it to the lower courts to determine when it
is “appropriate or necessary” for the SEC to disgorge funds from wrongdoers,
the way in which the statute was drafted invites new headaches for the SEC and
lower courts. A crucial question to be answered is whether the express grant of
authority to disgorge means the SEC no longer has to abide by the constraints
placed on this remedy by the Supreme Court’s Liu holding.320 Recall that when
the SEC pursued disgorgement under Section 78u(d)(5) as “equitable relief that
may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors,”321 the central
holding of Liu was that the SEC had to abide by equitable principles to avoid
transforming the remedy into a penalty.322 Under Liu, it would be equitable to
deprive a wrongdoer of their unjust enrichment, but it would not be equitable to
find them to be jointly and severally liable for the profits of another
wrongdoer.323 It would be equitable to deprive them of their profits, but, in doing
so, legitimate expenses must be deducted from the disgorgement penalty.324
Finally and most importantly for FCPA actions, the Court suggested that it might
not be equitable if the disgorged profits were sent to the Treasury rather than to
victims.325
The new language grants the SEC express authority to disgorge profits but
does not clarify whether the SEC is free from the limitations imposed by the Liu
decision.326 On the one hand, the SEC is likely to be emboldened by the express
permission to disgorge profits from those who unjustly enrich themselves.327
319
See Congress Buries Expansion of SEC Disgorgement Authority in Annual Defense Budget, supra note
307 (stating it is unclear whether courts would “eschew the equitable limitations placed on disgorgement in
Liu”).
320
See Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1940.
321
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) (2018).
322
See Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1942; see supra Part II.C.
323
See Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1945.
324
See id. at 1945–46.
325
See id. at 1947–48.
326
See Congress Buries Expansion of SEC Disgorgement Authority in Annual Defense Budget, supra note
307 (“If Congress . . . wanted to free the SEC from all equitable limitations identified in Liu, it could have said
so explicitly.”); Matthias Kleinsasser & Toby M. Galloway, Four Things You Need to Know About the Extended
Limitations
Period
for
SEC
Disgorgement,
NAT’L
L.
REV.
(Jan. 6,
2021),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/four-things-you-need-to-know-about-extended-limitations-period-secdisgorgement (“Do Liu’s restrictions on disgorgement still apply? The safer position is yes, but expect to see
litigation over this issue as well.”).
327
See Kevin R. Edgar, Teresa Goody Guillén, Bari R. Nadworny & Michelle N. Tanney, Congress Gives
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The Commission will likely argue that the addition of Section 78u(d)(7) in a
paragraph separate from the equitable remedies of Section 78u(d)(5) means the
disgorgement remedy is no longer an equitable one, and therefore does not have
to abide by those limitations.328 The express change to Section 78u(d)(3)(A)
granting district courts the jurisdiction to require disgorgement “of any unjust
enrichment by the person who received such unjust enrichment”329 implies that
Congress meant to follow Liu’s lead in prohibiting joint and several liability.330
Similarly, the exclusion of the phrase “for the benefit of investors” from Section
78u(d)(7)’s express granting of disgorgement powers could be read to allow
disgorged moneys to go to the Treasury, as in the case of FCPA violations.331
On the other hand, the bill could be interpreted to not “explicitly undercut any
of the limitations that the Court imposed in Liu.”332 This uncertainty is further
compounded by the fact that the new provisions do not explicitly define
disgorgement,333 once again leaving it to the courts to determine what this term
actually means.334 Because FCPA disgorgement awards are sent to the Treasury
rather than to wronged investors,335 whether these new provisions shed the
limitations imposed by the Liu decision is crucial.
Despite the uncertainty, courts should interpret the new Section 78u(d)(7)
provision to allow the SEC to disgorge funds to the Treasury in FCPA actions.
Liu was a source of congressional discontent and influenced the creation of these

SEC Game-Changing 10-Year Statute of Limitations for Disgorgement and Statutory Authority to Obtain
Disgorgement in Federal Court, BAKERHOSTETLER (Dec. 12, 2020), https://www.bakerlaw.com/alerts/
congress-gives-sec-game-changing-10-year-statute-of-limitations-for-disgorgement-and-statutory-authority-toobtain-disgorgement-in-federal-court (“The NDAA . . . will override doubts as to the Commission’s ability to
go after wrongdoers’ ill-gotten gains.”); see also Congress Buries Expansion of SEC Disgorgement Authority in
Annual Defense Budget, supra note 307 (“If enacted, the NDAA will likely embolden the SEC on numerous
levels.”).
328
See Defense Bill to Expand SEC Powers and Authority, JONES DAY: INSIGHTS (Dec. 2020),
https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2020/12/defense-bill-to-expand-sec-powers-and-authority.
329
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(A) (2018) (emphasis added).
330
Defense Bill to Expand SEC Powers and Authority, supra note 328.
331
Id. (arguing for the removal of nullified questions surrounding the SEC’s distribution of disgorgement
awards to the U.S. Treasury “for the benefit of investors”).
332
Congress Seeks to Amend Securities Laws on Disgorgement, KRAMER LEVIN (Dec. 22, 2020), https://
www.kramerlevin.com/en/perspectives-search/congress-proposes-to-amend-securities-laws-to-underscoreavailability-of-disgorgement-in-sec-federal-court-actions-and-to-extend-limitations-period-for-disgorgementin-fraud-actions-to-10-years.html.
333
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(4) (2018).
334
The Court in Liu pointed to possible definitions, including “[r]estitution measured by the defendant’s
wrongful gain” or an “[a]ccounting hold[ing] the defendant liable for his profits.” Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936,
1943 (2020) (citations omitted). But see id. at 1953 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The term disgorgement itself
invites abuse because it is a word with no fixed meaning.”).
335
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 161, at 34–35.
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new provisions.336 Committee discussion about a prior version of Section
6501337 shows that Congress intended to restore to the SEC its pre-Liu
disgorgement tools,338 which had been used frequently in high publicity FCPA
actions.339 By specifically and expressly granting the power to disgorge profits
for violations of securities laws, Congress meant to free this remedy from “the
limitations upon its availability that equity typically imposes.”340 While the
Court in Liu rejected the notion that subsequent changes to securities law could
“legislative[ly] reenact[]”341 the disgorgement remedy to be broader than equity
allowed,342 the quick and clear response of Congress to the Liu holding, as well
as the omission from Section 78u(d)(7) of any mention of equity or “benefit of
investors,” should free the SEC from these limitations. Furthermore, this
Comment argues that, even if the courts were to view disgorgement as beholden
by the limitations of equity, disgorgement to the Treasury in FCPA actions is
both “appropriate and necessary”343 and consistent with equitable principles.344
Therefore, such disgorgement should still be allowed, provided ordered
disgorgement abides by the other restrictions laid out in Liu.

336
See Congress Seeks to Amend Securities Laws on Disgorgement, supra note 332 (“The NDAA’s
securities law amendments are a partial response to Kokesh and Liu.”).
337
See Press Release, Ben McAdams, Rep., U.S. House of Representatives, McAdams’ Bipartisan Bills
to Combat Money-Laundering, Human Trafficking and Investment Scams Included in Defense Policy
Bill (Dec. 9, 2020), (available at https://www.legistorm.com/stormfeed/view_rss/1688599/member/3280/title/
mcadams-bipartisan-bills-to-combat-money-laundering-human-trafficking-and-investment-scams-included-indefense-policy-bill.html).
338
See 165 CONG. REC.184, H8930 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2019) (statement of Rep. Al Green) (stating the
bill would “ensure that the SEC has the tools it needs to hold bad actors accountable” and “the SEC does indeed
have disgorgement authority”).
339
See Mike Koehler, The SEC Has Collected Approximately $4.6 Billion in Disgorgement in FCPA
Actions, FCPA PROFESSOR (Apr. 20, 2020, 12:06 AM), https://fcpaprofessor.com/sec-collected-approximately4-6-billion-disgorgement-fcpa-enforcement-actions/ (“[S]ince [2004] the SEC has secured approximately $4.6
billion in disgorgement . . . .”).
340
Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1947 (2020) (quoting Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson,
534 U.S. 204, 211 n.1 (2002)).
341
See Gabaldon, supra note 102, at 1645 (“[W]hen a reenacted statute fails to change the prevailing
administrative or judicial interpretation of some earlier version of that statute, the interpretation is legislatively
endorsed.”).
342
See Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1947 (rejecting the prior construction principle because of the uncertain scope of
the disgorgement remedy); cf. Angel Reyes & Benjamin Hunter, Does the FTC Have Blood on Its Hands? An
Analysis of FTC Overreach and Abuse of Power After Liu, 68 BUFF. L. REV. 1481, 1484 (2020) (arguing that
Liu “underscores that the Court will no longer allow federal agencies to expand their powers beyond those
specifically granted by Congress”).
343
See supra Part III.A.
344
See supra Part III.B.
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2. Section 78u(d)’s Statute of Limitations Guidelines Will Create Confusion
for FCPA Enforcement
In addition to addressing the Court’s holding in Liu, Congress also took aim
at the Kokesh decision in Section 6501. Recall that in Kokesh, the Court held
that for the purposes of statute of limitations analysis, disgorgement under
Section 78u(d) was a penalty and, therefore, must abide by a five-year statute of
limitations restriction.345 While it could be argued that disgorgement that abided
by the Liu limitations was no longer a penalty, and therefore not restricted by
the Kokesh imposed statute of limitations requirement,346 Congress made the
issue a moot point by expressly laying out a statute of limitations framework for
securities provisions in Section 6501.
Section 6501 lays out specific statute of limitations ranges for efforts by the
SEC to disgorge funds under the new provision, Section 78u(d)(7), by adding
another new provision, Section 78u(d)(8). Section 78u(d)(8) establishes a
baseline statute of limitations for disgorgement actions of five years.347 Section
78u(d)(8) then increases the statute of limitations period to ten years for
violations of three specific securities laws.348 None of these specified securities
laws pertains to the FCPA.349 Additionally, the new provision increases the
statute of limitations to ten years for violations of securities laws that include
scienter as a requisite element to be proved.350 Finally, the new provision of
Section 78u(d) also provides that when the commission seeks a claim for an
equitable remedy under Section 78u(d)(5), the statute of limitations period will
also be ten years.351
The fact that FCPA violations are often well concealed means a long statute
of limitations period is key to ensuring that those who commit acts of foreign

345

See supra Part II.B.
See Andrew N. Vollmer, What Remains of Kokesh After Liu? 3 (June 26, 2020) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3636505) (arguing Liu overrode Kokesh).
347
See National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 116-283, § 6501(a)(3), 134 Stat. 3388, 3416
(2020) (“The Commission may bring a claim for disgorgement under paragraph (7) . . . (i) not later than 5 years
after the latest date of the violation that gives rise to the action or proceeding in which the Commission seeks
the claim occurs . . . .”).
348
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(8)(A)(ii)(I)-(III) (2018) (“[N]ot later than 10 years after the latest date of the
violation that gives rise to the action or proceeding in which the Commission seeks the claim . . . .”).
349
Id. § 78j(b); id. § 77q(a)(1); id. § 80b-6(1).
350
See id. § 78u(d)(8)(A)(ii)(IV) (“[A]ny other provision of the securities laws for which scienter must be
established.”).
351
See id. § 78u(d)(8)(B).
346
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bribery are not able to evade disgorgement of their ill-gotten gains.352 A ten-year
statute of limitations period would be especially desirable for these actions.
However, given that the FCPA is not one of the specified securities laws that
triggers the longer limitations period, the SEC may only be able to seek this
longer period for FCPA enforcement actions that require scienter to be
established.353 Here, the complexity of the FCPA will create some uncertainties
that the lower courts will have to untangle because whether scienter is required
depends on which provision of the FCPA is violated.
The Supreme Court has defined scienter both as “intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud”354 and as requiring a “degree of knowledge sufficient to
‘make a person legally responsible for the consequences of his or her act or
omission.’”355 Whether the SEC must prove scienter in enforcing FCPA actions
is complicated356 and will create issues for courts as they determine whether to
apply the baseline five-year statute of limitations period or the longer ten-year
period. First, for an issuer or agent of an issuer to be civilly liable for violating
the anti-bribery provision of the FCPA, which prohibits giving “anything of
value” to “any foreign official” to secure business, it must be done
“corruptly.”357 While the statute does not define “corruptly,”358 at least three
circuit courts have defined “corruptly” as requiring the sort of intent that the
courts view as “scienter,”359 and therefore this provision would trigger the tenyear statute of limitations period.360 To be liable under the anti-bribery
provisions for bribes to a third party rather than directly to a foreign official, the
government must show that the briber acted “while knowing that all or a portion”
of the bribe would go to a foreign official in order to obtain business.361 Unlike
352
Velikonja, supra note 59, at 414. (“FCPA cases frequently include violations that are . . . entirely
outside the limitations period . . . .”).
353
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(8)(A)(ii)(IV).
354
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
355
Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2195 (2019) (citation omitted).
356
See David P. Burns & Erin K. Sullivan, Navigating the FCPA’s Complex Scienter Requirements,
BLOOMBERG FIN. L.P. (Apr. 1, 2009), https://www.gibsondunn.com/navigating-the-fcpas-complex-scienterrequirements/ (“The question of what level of knowledge and intent is necessary to violate the FCPA is a
complicated one . . . .”).
357
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1) (2018).
358
Legislative history does indicate that this term implied scienter. S. REP. NO. 95–114, at 10 (1977) (“The
word ‘corruptly’ connotes an evil motive or purpose, an intent to wrongfully influence the recipient.” (emphasis
added)).
359
See United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 461, 464 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that jury instructions that stated
an act is done “corruptly” if it is “done voluntarily and intentionally” were appropriate); Stichting Ter
Behartiging v. Schreiber, 327 F.3d 173, 183 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308, 1312 (8th
Cir. 1991).
360
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(8)(A)(ii)(IV).
361
Id. § 78dd-1(a)(3).
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“corruptly,” the statute does define “knowing.”362 A person is “knowing” if they
are aware that they are engaging in the conduct, that the circumstance exists,363
or if they have a firm belief that the circumstance exists.364 Further, to prevent a
“head-in-the sand” type situation where a bribe-giver tries to remain willfully
ignorant that his bribe will end up in the hands of a foreign official,365 a person
is also knowing if they “are aware of the high probability of the existence of
such circumstance.”366 Because payments to third parties must be both “corrupt”
and “knowing,” the SEC would be required to prove scienter to disgorge funds
from wrongdoers, which would trigger the ten-year statute of limitations.367
Second, whether scienter exists for violations of the accounting provisions
is more complex. Issuers must abide by the “books and records” provision,
which states that the issuer “shall make and keep books, records, and accounts,
which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and
dispositions of the assets of the issuer.”368 There is no knowledge or intent
requirement for violations of this provision, so the provision creates strict
liability for issuers.369 Accordingly, the SEC would not need to establish scienter
to disgorge funds from an issuer who violates this provision,370 and therefore the
statute of limitations for these actions would only be five years.
However, it gets more difficult to ascertain whether the SEC has five years
or ten years to disgorge profits from persons, like Garth Peterson,371 who are
accused of violating the FCPA’s internal control provisions. The provision reads
that “[n]o person shall knowingly circumvent or knowingly fail to implement a
system of internal accounting controls or knowingly falsify any book, record, or
account described in paragraph (2).”372 Because the SEC must establish
knowledge—that is, scienter—it would have ten years to disgorge funds373 from
those such as Peterson who circumvented internal controls by misrepresenting

362

Id. § 78dd-1(f)(2)(A).
Id. § 78dd-1(f)(2)(A)(i).
364
Id. § 78dd-1(f)(2)(A)(ii).
365
Burns & Sullivan, supra note 356.
366
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(2)(B).
367
But cf. Burns & Sullivan, supra note 356 (arguing situations could exist in which a corporation would
be required to pay fines for downstream violations of the FCPA by agents despite an absence of knowledge or
intent by the corporation).
368
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
369
Burns & Sullivan, supra note 356.
370
Further, issuers are often held liable for the violations of subsidiaries. See id.
371
See supra Introduction.
372
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(5) (emphasis added).
373
Id. § 78u(d)(8)(A)(II).
363
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or failing to disclose bribes.374 Those who failed to implement accounting
controls would, likewise, be subject to the ten-year statute of limitations.
However, for those who falsify books or records in contravention of the FCPA,
an SEC regulation has essentially done away with the scienter requirement.375
Rather than intent, courts will look to the reasonableness of the person’s
behavior to analyze whether they should be held liable for the falsification of
records.376 For example, in the Peterson case, if a Morgan Stanley officer signed
off on the misappropriated payments to Peterson, then whether the officer was
liable for falsification of records would likely have been judged based on
whether those actions were reasonable.377 Here, because the statute says there is
a scienter requirement but an SEC regulation says there is not, whether courts
would impose a five-year or ten-year limitations period is an open question. This
could lead to an arguably absurd outcome, where those who circumvent the
accounting provisions are subject to a ten-year statute of limitations period while
those who falsify these records or even fail to keep records at all are subject to a
shorter, five-year period.
This raises a tangential but important third question: If the SEC is faced with
a situation in which it is limited by the five-year statute of limitations, but is
seeking to disgorge profits from a wrongdoer who has received ill-gotten gains
outside of that limitation period, can it still use disgorgement as an equitable
remedy under Section 78u(d)(5)? Under the new provision of Section
78u(d)(8)(B), “[t]he Commission may seek a claim for any equitable remedy,
including for an injunction or for a bar, suspension, or cease and desist order,
not later than ten years after the latest date on which a violation that gives rise
to the claim occurs.”378 While the new provisions of Section 78u(d)(7) do
provide express statutory authority for the SEC to seek disgorgement for
securities violations,379 this does not change the fact that the central holding of
Liu was that “a disgorgement award that does not exceed a wrongdoer’s net
profits and is awarded for victims is equitable relief permissible under

374

Complaint at 14, SEC v. Peterson, 2012 WL 1440462 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2012) (No. 12CV02033).
Falsification of Accounting Records, 17 CFR 240.13b2–1 (2017) (“No person shall directly or
indirectly, falsify or cause to be falsified, any book, record or account subject to section 13(b)(2)(A) of the
Securities Exchange Act.”).
376
See SEC v. Softpoint, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 846, 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“There is no scienter requirement;
liability is predicated on ‘standards of reasonableness.’”).
377
See id.; see also SEC v. Hilger, No. 06-10012-JGD, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123745, at *17 (D. Mass.
June 11, 2008) (holding that to establish liability for falsifying books the SEC must prove the defendant “falsified
or caused to be falsified” the books and that they “acted unreasonably in doing so”).
378
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(8)(B) (emphasis added).
379
Id. § 78u(d)(7).
375
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§ 78u(d)(5).”380 Congress was aware of the Liu holding, and the decision to
include the term “any” in Section 78u(d)(8)(B) could be read to allow a longer
statute of limitations for disgorgement remedies that still abided by the Liu
limitations. While courts will only grant equitable remedies when legal remedies
are inadequate,381 cutting off the statute of limitations for disgorgement actions
based on confusion over whether the language of the provision or the language
of an SEC regulation applies makes the legal remedy inadequate as applied to
persons who falsify books and records in violation of the FCPA.382
B. Future Revisions to the FCPA Should Specify a Ten-Year Statute of
Limitations for FCPA Actions and Route Disgorgement Money to Fund the
SEC
Congress should return to these provisions and revise them in two
substantive ways. First, Subsection One argues that Congress should add the
FCPA to the list of securities laws that allow a ten-year statute of limitations
period for disgorgement of ill-gotten gains. The erratic way in which statutes of
limitations will apply to the FCPA—because of the uncertain presence of
scienter as an element to be proved—will create headaches for courts, as well as
companies who should have a reasonable idea of how long they might be liable
for securities law violations. Second, Subsection Two argues that Congress
should revisit and rewrite the way in which the SEC is funded. A firm statute of
limitations for SEC enforcement actions is needed because, currently, SEC
investigations take too long to complete.383 A better funded SEC will be able to
investigate violations more promptly and will also be better insulated from the
future whims of Congress.
1. Congress Should Add the FCPA Anti-Bribery and Accounting Provisions
to Section 78u(8)(A)(ii)
The first revision Congress should make to the disgorgement provision is to
insert the FCPA anti-bribery and accounting provisions into Section
78u(8)(A)(ii) so that violations of these provisions clearly qualify for the tenyear statute of limitations period. The legislative history behind the recent statute
380

Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1940 (2020).
Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509 (1959) (“[I]n the federal courts equity has always
acted only when legal remedies were inadequate . . . .”).
382
See Sanders v. Mt. Am. Fed. Credit Union, 689 F. 3d 1138, 1144 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Even when legal
remedies are inadequate, courts must also weigh the case-specific equities in favor of both parties and the public
interest before granting equitable relief.”).
383
See Gray Cloud, supra note 109.
381
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of limitations changes shows that Congress was deeply concerned about
fraudsters keeping their ill-gotten gains simply because of a technicality.384 The
SEC and court systems would be much better served with a clear, uniform statute
of limitations for all FCPA enforcement actions rather than being forced to waste
limited resources litigating whether someone who falsified company records
should escape with ill-gotten gains between five and ten years ago.385
Uncertainty over what statute of limitations exists for those who falsify business
records means wrongdoers who might otherwise have agreed to a settlement
offer386 would have a strong incentive to challenge the SEC’s efforts to disgorge
profits in court and could escape with ill-gotten gains.387 Furthermore, because
FCPA cases do not typically have identifiable defrauded investors who will sue
for restitution,388 they are precisely the type of cases where there are “fewer
causes of actions and safeguards available” to protect the sanctity of the market
and disincentivize violators.389 Allowing bad actors to benefit from their fraud
causes real harm to the capital markets system, which will not work if investors
do not “have faith that bad actors can’t profit off wrongdoing.”390 Because there
is bipartisan support for increasing time limits for the SEC to use their
disgorgement power to address these sorts of long-running frauds391—even

384
See 165 CONG. REC. H8930 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2019) (statement of Rep. Green) (“[Kokesh] was a boon
to white-collar criminals . . . who are now able to defraud investors for a decade and keep their profits.”);
Velikonja, supra note 59, at 396 (“Congress must intervene because the status quo allows fraudsters who are
caught to keep the money they stole under a legal technicality . . . .”).
385
See 165 CONG. REC. H8930 (statement of Rep. McAdams) (“[T]he SEC is increasingly spending time
and staff resources fighting new legal challenges from bad actors . . . .”).
386
Indicative of the large sums at stake is the Petrobras Lavo Jato FCPA scandal, which resulted in the
largest settlement in FCPA history. The settlement resulted from Petrobras admitting that certain executives
signed false accounting certifications while paying bribes to Brazilian politicians. See Nicholas M. Berg, Maria
González Calvet, David Peet & Eve L. Shabto, Petrobras Reaches $1.78 Billion FCPA Resolution, ROPES &
GRAY (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.ropesgray.com/-/media/Files/alerts/2018/10/20181001_AC_Alert.pdf.
387
See Defense Bill to Expand SEC Powers and Authority, supra note 328 (arguing companies should
consider strict time limits in tolling agreements with the SEC in non-fraud claims).
388
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 161, at 24.
389
See 165 CONG. REC. H8932 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2019) (statement of SEC Chairman Jay Clayton) (“[A]
period longer than five years from the date of the misconduct is appropriate in various circumstances.”).
390
See id. (statement of Rep. McAdams); Velikonja, supra note 59, at 396 (arguing that allowing
fraudsters to keep their money “undermines the credibility of the federal enforcement program”).
391
The bill, which included the current increases to the SEC’s statute of limitations, enjoyed strong
bipartisan support. But increases to the statute of limitations were a small part of a massive, 1,480-page bill.
William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, H.R. 6395, 116th Cong.
(2021). However, the earlier provision, which would have given the SEC a fourteen-year statute of limitations
for disgorgement, passed the House with a 314 to 95 vote with bipartisan support. The parallel Senate bill that
died in committee also had bipartisan sponsors. See Hazel Bradford, House Passes Bill to Reverse Supreme
Court Decision on SEC Disgorgement, PENSIONS & INVS. (Nov. 19, 2019, 12:40 PM),
https://www.pionline.com/
legislation/house-passes-bill-reverse-supreme-court-decision-sec-disgorgement.
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amongst those hesitant about increasing the statute of limitations periods392—
Congress should expressly increase the statute of limitations period for FCPA
enforcement to at least ten years at first opportunity.
2. Congress Should Provide that Disgorgement Funds Go to Self-Funding
the SEC
Congressional and judicial concerns about raising the statute of limitations
beyond ten years393 reflect a well-founded concern: SEC investigations take
longer than they should.394 However, this is due more to a lack of effective
funding395 and excessive responsibilities396 than to any kind of lethargy on
behalf of the SEC. Moving forward, Congress should create new legislation that
directs a portion of disgorged funds in FCPA actions to the SEC rather than to
the Treasury. Presently, the SEC is reliant on funding from annual
appropriations from Congress.397 While these appropriations have increased in
recent years,398 they have not increased in a manner commensurate with the new
responsibilities the SEC has as a regulatory agency.399 The SEC, “first and
foremost a disclosure agency,”400 has seen its enforcement powers grow
392
See 165 CONG. REC. H8930 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2019) (statement of Rep. Wagner) (stating that, despite
concerns about a longer statute of limitations, she supports a fourteen-year statute of limitations as a reasonable
“first attempt”).
393
See id.; cf. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1641 (2017) (noting that statutes of limitations are “vital
to the welfare of society” (citation omitted)).
394
See Richard E. Brodsky, Securities Exchange Act Section 4E(A): Toothless “Internal-Timing
Directive” or Statute of Limitation?, 11 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 323, 326 (2020) (“SEC enforcement is and
has long been dogged by excessive delay.”).
395
Cf. SEC Funding, CFA INST., https://www.cfainstitute.org/en/advocacy/issues/sec-funding (last visited
Feb. 2, 2022) (“[T]he lack of adequate resources available to the SEC contributed to its inability to more
aggressively police the financial markets in recent years.”).
396
Cf. Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on Adoption of Resource Extraction
Disclosure Rules (Dec. 16, 2020) (available at https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/clayton-resourceextraction-2020-12-16) (describing the SEC’s responsibilities to implement “resource extraction rules” due to
Dodd-Frank as “resource-consuming”).
397
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-268T, FEDERAL FEES, FINES, AND PENALTIES:
OBSERVATIONS ON AGENCY SPENDING AUTHORITIES 8 (2016) (“[A]t the end of fiscal year 2014, the SEC had
$6.6 billion unavailable balance in its Salaries and Expenses account because the fee collections exceeded
appropriations.”).
398
The SEC’s budget increased in 2021 by $105 million. Melanie Waddell, SEC, IRS Get Budget Boosts,
THINKADVISOR (July 16, 2020, 4:22 PM), https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2020/07/16/sec-irs-get-budget-boosts/.
399
See Brittany Fritsch, Comment, Broken Windows Is a Broken Policy, 47 U. TOL. L. REV. 767, 788–89
(2016) (arguing “the SEC is significantly underfunded and lacks the resources” to strictly regulate for
compliance); Memo to Congress: It’s Time for SEC to Be Self-Funded, INVESTMENTNEWS (May 25, 2011),
https://www.investmentnews.com/memo-to-congress-its-time-for-sec-to-be-self-funded-36304.
400
Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at Society of Corporate
Secretaries & Governance Professionals (July 11, 2013) (available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spch071113dmghtm).
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extensively every time the United States survives a financial crisis.401 This is
unlikely to change under the Biden administration, where it is likely the SEC
will be even more active in pursuing enforcement actions.402 By siphoning some
of the exorbitant amounts secured from FCPA actions to the SEC itself,403 the
SEC would be better insulated from political wrangling over funding that led to
the impasse of the NDAA prior to its passage.404 Accordingly, those who violate
the FCPA would be less likely to escape with their ill-gotten gains simply
because the SEC is underfunded.405
Further, because the SEC was designed to be a nonpartisan organization,406
freeing it from annual appropriations should allow the relatively scandal-free
agency407 to better enforce securities regulations without worry that political
figures will threaten its budget for personal or political gain.408 Allowing the
SEC a portion of the money it disgorges from financial frauds would mirror
current funding procedures that give the Environmental Protection Agency a
portion of the money imposed as a penalty for superfund cleanups so that it can
address future environmental messes.409 An increased budget would better
enable the SEC to proactively find and stop financial messes caused by those
like Bernie Madoff or the operators of the next Enron, and is better than once
again giving the agency powers as a reactive measure following another injury
to our financial markets.410
401
See Mike Koehler, SEC Commissioners Acknowledge that Anti-Corruption Policy Is Outside the SEC’s
Area of Expertise, FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec. 17, 2020), https://fcpaprofessor.com/sec-commissioners-acknowledgeanti-corruption-policy-outside-secs-area-expertise/.
402
See Dean Seal, What Biden’s Win Means for SEC Enforcement, Leadership, LAW360 (Nov. 8, 2020,
5:17 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1323742/what-biden-s-win-means-for-sec-enforcement-leadership
(“You are likely to see a more aggressive enforcement division under Biden, one that would be more willing to
litigate aggressively . . . .”).
403
In 2019, the SEC collected approximately $1.03 billion in FCPA enforcement actions. See SEC FCPA
Enforcement–2019 Year in Review, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 9, 2020), https://fcpaprofessor.com/sec-fcpaenforcement-2019-year-review/.
404
See Roberta S. Karmel, Threats to the SEC’s Independence, ABA (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.
americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2016/12/09_karmel/.
405
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Finally, there is sufficient political will to pass this type of legislation. Other
financial regulatory agencies, such as the Federal Reserve and the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, are already self-funded, thanks to congressional
foresight.411 The express grant of disgorgement powers to the SEC and
lengthening of statute of limitations periods shows that Congress is in favor of
empowering the agency to stop fraudulent acts that threaten the nation’s
financial health.412 Further, given the current nationalist political climate,413
allocating some of the disgorged FCPA money to the SEC is more likely to pass
muster with Congress than competing solutions that suggest funneling the
money to other nations or to an entity like the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).414 As a majority of the largest
disgorgement awards come from foreign companies rather than American
companies,415 this solution should be more amenable to those who malign the
FCPA as impeding the competitiveness of American businesses.416
CONCLUSION
The SEC’s ability to disgorge profits from those who violate the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is an invaluable tool that disincentivizes acts of
bribery and incentivizes the maintenance of internal controls over issuers’ books
and records. Prevention of corruption encourages businesses, both American and
foreign, to compete on an even playing field. Additionally, it has related benefits,
such as encouraging rule of law and preventing human rights abuses.
The suggestion in Liu that disgorgement is not allowed if the SEC sends the
funds to the Treasury has created a situation in which those who commit acts of
bribery abroad can be financially rewarded for their wrongdoing. Congress’s
passage of new legislation that grants the SEC the express authority to disgorge
411
Brooksley Born & William Donaldson, Make Regulators Self-Funding, POLITICO (Mar. 10, 2013, 9:03
PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2013/03/self-funding-of-regulators-would-help-fiscal-mess-088666.
412
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Enforce FCPA in Light of China Phase One Deal (Feb. 26, 2020) (available at https://www.rubio.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm/2020/2/rubio-urges-attorney-general-barr-to-vigilantly-enforce-fcpa-in-light-of-china-phaseone-deal) (urging Attorney General Barr to enforce the FCPA against companies in China to safeguard American
investors).
413
See Greg Ip, Biden, Beware: The Nationalist Moment Hasn’t Passed, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 11, 2020,
12:18 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-beware-the-nationalist-moment-hasnt-passed-11605112395.
414
See Matthew C. Turk, A Political Economy Approach to Reforming the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
33 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 325, 329 (2013).
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Eight of the ten largest FCPA settlements were for companies based outside the United States. See
Michael S. Diamant, Christopher W. H. Sullivan & Jason H. Smith, FCPA Enforcement Against U.S. and NonU.S. Companies, 8 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 353, 355 (2019).
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profits and raise the statute of limitations to ten years is a laudable first step to
addressing this problem, but it is not sufficient.
This Comment proposes that courts interpret Section 78u of the Exchange
Act to allow money to be returned to the Treasury in FCPA actions, regardless
of whether limitations from the Liu decision are extant. Further, this Comment
argues that, given the uncertainty that the Liu decision created and that the new
legislation will create, Congress should return to the drawing board and make
several changes. First, Congress should expressly allow funds from FCPA
disgorgement to go to the Treasury. Second, Congress should raise the statute of
limitations for all FCPA actions to ten years. Third, Congress should redirect
some of the disgorged money to the SEC specifically, rather than to the
Treasury, so that the SEC can better handle its large portfolio of responsibilities.
As a result, the SEC will be better positioned to protect investors, disincentivize
corruption, and ensure an equitable playing field for all businesses abroad.
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